2023 Ohio 4119
Ohio Ct. App.2023Background
- Defendant Jaymarlon Hayes (committed acts at ages 18–19; IQ 72; untreated mental-health history) pleaded guilty to multiple offenses arising from four related incidents in June–December 2021: drug trafficking, armed robberies (with firearm specifications), felonious assault, having weapons while under disability, grand theft, involuntary manslaughter and related vehicular-assault/failure-to-comply counts after a high-speed police pursuit that resulted in one death.
- At plea and sentencing Hayes was advised about Reagan Tokes; defense repeatedly objected to Reagan Tokes as unconstitutional (later resolved against Hayes in Hacker). Hayes urged mitigation based on youth, cognitive deficits, remorse, cooperation, and difficult upbringing.
- The trial court imposed maximum terms on most counts, ordered the sentences to run consecutively across the four cases, and imposed an aggregate sentence of 71.5 years (including 11 years of gun specifications). The court made R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive-sentence findings on the record.
- Hayes appealed, arguing the consecutive-sentence findings were not supported by the record and thus the aggregate sentence was contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
- Applying Ohio precedent on appellate review of consecutive sentences (including guidance from State v. Gwynne), the court reviewed the record de novo under the clear-and-convincing standard and concluded the proportionality finding was not clearly and convincingly supported.
- The court modified the aggregate punishment: eight years of firearm specifications to be served prior and consecutively to a definite 36-month term and an indefinite term of 33–49.5 years; remanded to impose the statutory driver’s-license suspension (which sentencing court had omitted); otherwise affirmed convictions.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Hayes's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are supported by the record | The court made the required statutory findings on the record; consecutive terms necessary to protect public and punish given Hayes’s crime spree and juvenile history | Consecutive sentences are disproportionate and unsupported by the record given Hayes’s youth, cognitive deficits, remorse, and the record’s limited evidentiary support | The appellate court held the proportionality finding was not clearly and convincingly supported and modified the aggregate sentence |
| Whether the trial court considered the aggregate sentence when making consecutive-sentence findings | State relied on the trial court’s express findings and its discretion | Hayes argued the court failed to consider aggregate effect (per Gwynne guidance) and thus findings are inadequate | The appellate court applied the requirement (per Gwynne authority) that the trial court’s findings be supported as to the aggregate sentence and found them unsupported in this record |
| Whether sentencing entries omitted statutory obligations (driver’s-license suspension) | State did not contest the omission | Hayes noted the court failed to impose required lifetime suspension for the failure-to-comply/vehicular offense | Court remanded for the trial court to impose the required driver’s-license suspension |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bonnell, 16 N.E.3d 659 (Ohio 2014) (trial court must make statutory consecutive-sentence findings on the record)
- State v. Fischer, 942 N.E.2d 332 (Ohio 2010) (limits on trial-court discretion and statutory sentencing framework)
- State v. Williams, 71 N.E.3d 234 (Ohio 2016) (interaction of sentencing statutes and appellate review)
- State v. Marcum, 59 N.E.3d 1231 (Ohio 2016) (definition of clear-and-convincing standard cited for sentencing review)
- State v. Gwynne, 141 N.E.3d 169 (Ohio 2019) (clarified limits of appellate review and role of R.C. 2953.08 in consecutive-sentence challenges)
- State v. Jones, 169 N.E.3d 649 (Ohio 2020) (interpretation of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) and appellate authority over sentencing)
- Cross v. Ledford, 120 N.E.2d 118 (Ohio 1954) (classic formulation of clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard)
