State v. Hayes, 182 Wash. 2d 556

Larry Hayes was charged with multiple offenses arising from a large identity-theft scheme; jury convicted him on several counts and entered special verdicts finding each offense to be a “major economic offense.”
Jury instructions permitted conviction on either principal or accomplice liability; the State did not argue Hayes was convicted as a principal and Hayes proceeded as an accomplice for the issue at hand.
The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence for a major economic offense based on the jury’s special verdict; appellate proceedings vacated other convictions and remanded, and the State sought another exceptional sentence on the first-degree identity-theft count.
The Court of Appeals held the major economic-offense aggravators could not be imposed on an accomplice absent express statutory language making them applicable to accomplices; the State sought review.
The Washington Supreme Court held that where an aggravator is phrased in terms of “the current offense,” it may be applied to an accomplice only if the jury finds facts showing the defendant had knowledge that informs that aggravator (i.e., the aggravator must be tied to the accomplice’s own conduct); because the special verdict did not make such a finding, the exceptional sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Issue	State's Argument	Hayes's Argument	Held
Whether major economic-offense aggravators phrased as applying to “the current offense” can be used to impose an exceptional sentence on an accomplice without additional findings	Aggravators refer to the offense; if the offense qualifies, all participants (principal or accomplice) may receive an exceptional sentence; sentencing judge can exercise discretion to account for individual culpability	Aggravators cannot be applied to an accomplice unless the aggravator is shown to derive from the accomplice’s own conduct or knowledge	For aggravators phrased as to “the current offense,” jury must make a finding that the defendant had knowledge that informs the aggravator; absent such a finding, aggravator cannot be applied to an accomplice

State v. McKim, 98 Wn.2d 111 (1982) (an enhancement lacking triggering language must be tied to the accused’s own misconduct; knowledge requirement to impute deadly-weapon status to an accomplice)
State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wn.2d 472 (1994) (distinguishes McKim where enhancement does not require participant knowledge; some enhancements apply regardless of individual knowledge)
State v. Pineda-Pineda, 154 Wn. App. 653 (2010) (applies McKim reasoning to vacate a drug-free zone enhancement where no evidence the accomplice was present or knew of zone placement)
State v. McDonald, 138 Wn.2d 680 (1999) (principal and accomplice liability are not alternative means; jury need only find participation)
State v. Roberts, 142 Wn.2d 471 (2000) (constitutional limits may require findings of major participation for certain extreme punishments for accomplices)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (facts supporting sentence enhancements generally must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)