State v. Hawkins
366 P.3d 884
Utah Ct. App.2016Background
- Empire Custom Homes (managed by Bowen and Chapple) contracted to buy Deer Canyon lots but lacked funds to complete utilities; closing on 13 lots was required to raise needed infrastructure money.
- Hawkins worked for Empire Homes and told DPC and the victim (and the victim’s broker/brother‑in‑law) that funding existed (a private trust), utilities were not a problem, and there was an insurance policy and developer perks (a cruise).
- The victim purchased two lots, paid large down payments (totaling ~ $852,000 lost), and Empire Homes failed to obtain financing; lenders foreclosed and the victim lost his investment.
- Hawkins was tried separately on two counts of communications fraud: acquitted on one count and convicted on the other; he appealed raising five main issues.
- The trial court denied Hawkins’s motions to quash bindover and for directed verdict, refused to give a duty‑to‑disclose instruction, rejected various trial‑fairness claims, denied a speedy‑trial violation, and denied Hawkins’s motion to be declared indigent with appointment of his private counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency / "devised" element of communications fraud | State: evidence showed Hawkins devised and executed the scheme via misrepresentations and documents (risk disclosure) | Hawkins: no evidence he "devised" or planned the scheme; statute should require planning, not mere participation | Affirmed: jury instructions defined "devise" as contrive/plan; circumstantial and direct evidence supported a finding Hawkins devised the scheme; any preliminary‑hearing error cured by guilty verdict |
| Duty to disclose / material omissions instruction | State: statute covers false representations or material omissions; no separate duty‑to‑disclose element required | Hawkins: conviction may have rested on omissions; jury should be instructed that a duty to disclose is required to convict on omissions | Held harmless: court refused duty instruction but sufficient affirmative misrepresentations existed so omission instruction error (if any) was not prejudicial |
| Fair trial (expert testimony, prosecutorial misconduct, jury instructions) | Hawkins: experts withheld or misstated testimony; prosecutor threatened perjury prosecution; jury instruction errors denied him a fair trial | State: many claims inadequately briefed or outside the record; curative instructions given where applicable | Affirmed: appellate court rejected most claims as inadequately briefed or unsupported; no cumulative error undermined trial fairness |
| Speedy trial (Sixth Amendment) | Hawkins: delay (~40 months) violated his speedy‑trial right | State: many delays were waived or caused by Hawkins; relevant delay was seven months after Hawkins first asserted the right | Held: no violation — relevant delay was seven months (not presumptively prejudicial); waivers and defendant‑caused delays were controlling |
| Indigency / appointment of retained counsel | Hawkins: indigent and asked appointment of his private counsel as indigent defender on first day of trial | State: Salt Lake County uses LDA; court may appoint noncontract counsel only for compelling reasons; Hawkins waited until trial day | Held: denial affirmed — no compelling reason shown to appoint noncontract counsel; motion came too late and appeared designed to have private counsel paid by public funds |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Jeffs, 243 P.3d 1250 (Utah 2010) (standard of review — reviewing facts in light most favorable to jury)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four‑factor speedy trial balancing test)
- State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995) (bindover standard requires sufficient evidence that the crime was committed and defendant committed it)
- State v. Clark, 20 P.3d 300 (Utah 2001) (bindover quantum less than directed‑verdict standard)
- State v. Nielsen, 326 P.3d 645 (Utah 2014) (directed‑verdict / sufficiency review is highly deferential)
- Hi‑Country Prop. Rights Group v. Emmer, 304 P.3d 851 (Utah 2013) (use of ordinary/dictionary meaning in statutory interpretation)
