251 P.3d 253
Wash. Ct. App.2011Background
- Hathaway visited an inmate; jail staff performed a visitor screening that included driver licensing information.
- Deputy Anderson learned Hathaway’s driving privileges were suspended and monitored whether she left by car.
- Hathaway drove away, was stopped, detained, and arrested after confirming suspension of her license.
- During a search incident to arrest, a vial containing methamphetamine was found near Hathaway’s foot; lab later confirmed 0.47 grams.
- She was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and third-degree driving with a suspended license; trial featured debates over jury instructions.
- Convicted of unlawful possession; sentencing included a jury demand fee $1,604.53, later challenged as excessive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the licensing-record check a privacy violation? | Hathaway argues privacy rights were violated under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. | State contends no intrusion into privacy and reasonableness under governing standards. | No privacy violation; searches were permissible. |
| Is the evidence sufficient to prove possession of methamphetamine? | State failed to prove possession beyond reasonable doubt. | State proved actual possession beyond reasonable doubt. | Sufficient evidence supports unlawful possession; Hathaway had actual possession. |
| Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying a mere proximity jury instruction? | Proximity alone is insufficient; instruction should have been given. | General possession instruction adequately allows defense theory. | No abuse; general instruction allowed argument of theory. |
| Did the to-convict instruction improperly add an unlawful possession element? | Instruction improperly required unlawful possession as an element. | Unlawful possession is implicit; instruction harmless. | No reversible error; implicit unlawfulness does not change verdict; harmless error. |
| Is the jury demand fee properly reviewable on direct appeal, and is it within statutory limits? | Jury demand fee exceeded statutory maximum and is reviewable. | LFOs are not final judgments on direct appeal; fee within statutory framework. | Remand to correct the jury demand fee to comply with statutory limits. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wash.2d 515 (2008) (state constitution privacy analysis; Gunwall not required)
- State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20 (2002) (no protected privacy interest in DOL driver records under art. I, §7)
- State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251 (2003) (state constitutional interpretation; independent analysis)
- State v. Martin, 106 Wash.App. A850 (2001) (reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment search when reviewing license checks)
- State v. Castle, 86 Wash.App. 48 (1997) (rejected mere proximity instruction where general possession instruction sufficed)
- State v. Portrey, 102 Wash.App. 898 (2000) (proximity evidence and general possession instruction discussed)
- State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wash.2d 528 (2004) (unlawful possession; affirmative defense of lawful possession)
- State v. Staley, 123 Wash.2d 794 (1994) (possession elements; constructive vs actual possession)
- State v. Willlis, 153 Wash.2d 366 (2005) (de novo review of jury instruction errors)