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251 P.3d 253
Wash. Ct. App.
2011
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Background

  • Hathaway visited an inmate; jail staff performed a visitor screening that included driver licensing information.
  • Deputy Anderson learned Hathaway’s driving privileges were suspended and monitored whether she left by car.
  • Hathaway drove away, was stopped, detained, and arrested after confirming suspension of her license.
  • During a search incident to arrest, a vial containing methamphetamine was found near Hathaway’s foot; lab later confirmed 0.47 grams.
  • She was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and third-degree driving with a suspended license; trial featured debates over jury instructions.
  • Convicted of unlawful possession; sentencing included a jury demand fee $1,604.53, later challenged as excessive.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Was the licensing-record check a privacy violation? Hathaway argues privacy rights were violated under article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment. State contends no intrusion into privacy and reasonableness under governing standards. No privacy violation; searches were permissible.
Is the evidence sufficient to prove possession of methamphetamine? State failed to prove possession beyond reasonable doubt. State proved actual possession beyond reasonable doubt. Sufficient evidence supports unlawful possession; Hathaway had actual possession.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying a mere proximity jury instruction? Proximity alone is insufficient; instruction should have been given. General possession instruction adequately allows defense theory. No abuse; general instruction allowed argument of theory.
Did the to-convict instruction improperly add an unlawful possession element? Instruction improperly required unlawful possession as an element. Unlawful possession is implicit; instruction harmless. No reversible error; implicit unlawfulness does not change verdict; harmless error.
Is the jury demand fee properly reviewable on direct appeal, and is it within statutory limits? Jury demand fee exceeded statutory maximum and is reviewable. LFOs are not final judgments on direct appeal; fee within statutory framework. Remand to correct the jury demand fee to comply with statutory limits.

Key Cases Cited

  • State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wash.2d 515 (2008) (state constitution privacy analysis; Gunwall not required)
  • State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20 (2002) (no protected privacy interest in DOL driver records under art. I, §7)
  • State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251 (2003) (state constitutional interpretation; independent analysis)
  • State v. Martin, 106 Wash.App. A850 (2001) (reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment search when reviewing license checks)
  • State v. Castle, 86 Wash.App. 48 (1997) (rejected mere proximity instruction where general possession instruction sufficed)
  • State v. Portrey, 102 Wash.App. 898 (2000) (proximity evidence and general possession instruction discussed)
  • State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wash.2d 528 (2004) (unlawful possession; affirmative defense of lawful possession)
  • State v. Staley, 123 Wash.2d 794 (1994) (possession elements; constructive vs actual possession)
  • State v. Willlis, 153 Wash.2d 366 (2005) (de novo review of jury instruction errors)
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Case Details

Case Name: State v. Hathaway
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Washington
Date Published: May 3, 2011
Citations: 251 P.3d 253; 161 Wash.App. 634; 40181-9-II
Docket Number: 40181-9-II
Court Abbreviation: Wash. Ct. App.
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