State v. Hartzell, 933 N.W.2d 441

In March 2017 Sgt. Raelee VanWinkle stopped Shalynn Hartzell for expired registration; Hartzell was alone and VanWinkle issued a fix-it ticket, returned Hartzell’s license/registration, told her to “have a good night” and began to walk back to her patrol vehicle.
After reaching the rear of Hartzell’s car, VanWinkle reapproached and asked, “Hey, before you go, do you have a minute to talk to me?” Hartzell agreed and verbally consented to a search.
The search produced marijuana, a digital scale with a white crystalline substance, a meth pipe, and, after arrest, a baggie of methamphetamine later lab-confirmed at .94 grams. Hartzell was arrested and made statements admitting recent meth use.
Hartzell moved to suppress the evidence and statements as the product of an unlawful extended seizure; the district court denied the motion, and after a bench trial Hartzell was convicted of possession of methamphetamine.
The sentencing judge pronounced probation and later entered a sentencing journal entry referring to a separate Order of Probation that was not entered until months later. Hartzell filed a notice of appeal after the announcement but before the probation order was entered.
The Nebraska Supreme Court considered (1) whether it had jurisdiction given the timing of the probation order, and (2) whether the post-stop encounter was a continued seizure (invoking Fourth Amendment protection) or a new, voluntary encounter that rendered consent valid.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jurisdiction over appeal given separate probation order	Notice of appeal was premature because final probation order had not been entered	Notice of appeal filed after announcement of sentence triggers savings clause under §25-1912(2)	Court had jurisdiction under §25-1912(2); premature notice treated as filed on date of final entry
Was the reapproach and request to search a continued seizure (Fourth Amendment)	Reapproach never de-escalated the stop; the subsequent request was an unlawful expansion of the stop	Initial stop ended when documents returned and officer said “drive safe”; reapproach was a new, voluntary encounter	Reapproach was a tier-one voluntary encounter, not a seizure; no Fourth Amendment violation
Was consent to search tainted by any prior illegality (attenuation doctrine)	Consent was product of exploitation of prior illegality and therefore fruit of the poisonous tree	No prior illegality occurred at the time of consent, so attenuation is inapplicable	Attenuation argument fails because there was no unlawful seizure when consent was given
Trial court entered suppression order before receiving reply briefs — procedural error?	Decision was premature and therefore erroneous	Trial court later reviewed reply briefs and declined to vacate; no prejudice shown	No prejudicial error; court’s later review cured concern

State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479 (1993) (articulates three-tier framework for police-citizen encounters)
State v. Gilliam, 292 Neb. 770 (2016) (patrol lights alone do not necessarily indicate a seizure)
State v. Schriner, 303 Neb. 476 (2019) (seizure analysis and reasonable-person standard)
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002) (comparison case where reapproach was found not de-escalated)
State v. Hedgcock, 277 Neb. 805 (2009) (officer tone/requests and voluntary encounters)
State v. Barbeau, 301 Neb. 293 (2018) (traffic stops analyzed as tier-two seizures)
State v. Gorup, 279 Neb. 841 (2010) (discusses attenuation/fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine)