State v. Hartzell
304 Neb. 82
Neb.2019Background
- In March 2017 Sgt. Raelee VanWinkle stopped Hartzell for expired registration, issued a fix-it ticket, returned her license/registration, said “have a good night / drive careful[ly],” and began walking back to her patrol vehicle.
- VanWinkle then reapproached Hartzell, asked “do you have a minute to talk to me?” and requested consent to search; Hartzell verbally consented.
- The vehicle search uncovered marijuana, a scale with a white crystalline residue, and a meth pipe; Hartzell was arrested and a subsequent search of her person produced a baggie later confirmed to contain 0.94 g methamphetamine.
- Hartzell moved to suppress the evidence and statements as products of an unlawful extended seizure; the district court denied suppression and, after a bench trial, convicted Hartzell of methamphetamine possession.
- On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed (1) whether the traffic stop had terminated before the reapproach (i.e., whether the second encounter was consensual), (2) attenuation/fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree, and (3) a jurisdictional timing issue arising from separate sentencing and probation orders.
Issues
| Issue | Hartzell's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the initial traffic stop continued (i.e., the reapproach was a seizure) | The encounter never de-escalated; reapproach was an unlawful expansion/continuation of the stop so consent was tainted | The stop had been completed when documents were returned and VanWinkle told her to drive safely; the reapproach was a new, voluntary encounter | The court held the stop had terminated; the reapproach was a tier‑one consensual encounter (no seizure) |
| Whether consent to search was invalid as fruit of prior illegality (attenuation) | Consent was product of an ongoing illegal seizure, thus tainted | There was no Fourth Amendment violation at the time of consent, so attenuation is inapplicable | Attenuation not implicated because no unlawful seizure occurred at reapproach; consent upheld |
| Whether the appeal was timely given separate sentencing and later probation order | (Procedural) Notice filed after oral announcement but before entry of separate probation order — potential jurisdictional issue | §25‑1912(2) treats premature notice as filed after entry when notice follows announcement of a final, appealable decision | Court found jurisdiction under §25‑1912(2); admonished that separate sentencing/probation orders are disapproved and the full judgment should be entered at once |
| Whether the district court erred in denying reconsideration because it issued the suppression order before receiving reply briefs | The court acted prematurely and that rendered the decision erroneous | The court reviewed the reply briefs afterward and declined to vacate; no prejudice shown | No prejudicial error; denial of reconsideration affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Van Ackeren, 242 Neb. 479 (Neb. 1993) (articulates three‑tier framework for police–citizen encounters)
- State v. Schriner, 303 Neb. 476 (Neb. 2019) (Fourth Amendment seizure analysis)
- State v. Gilliam, 292 Neb. 770 (Neb. 2016) (patrol vehicle lights alone do not necessarily mean a person is not free to leave)
- State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002) (addressing de‑escalation and when a reapproach remains part of an investigatory stop)
- State v. Hedgcock, 277 Neb. 805 (Neb. 2009) (approach/questioning does not constitute seizure absent coercive indicators)
- State v. Barbeau, 301 Neb. 293 (Neb. 2018) (traffic stop as tier‑two seizure)
- State v. Gorup, 279 Neb. 841 (Neb. 2010) (attenuation / fruit‑of‑the‑poisonous‑tree principles)