State v. Hartsfield, 308 Ga. App. 753

Hartsfield was arrested on April 16, 2005, and indicted on April 14, 2009, for aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and three counts of violation of oath by a public officer.
The case was placed on a trial calendar in July 2010, and Hartsfield moved to dismiss the indictment for speedy-trial violation on July 30, 2010; the motion was granted on August 6, 2010.
The State appeals, arguing the trial court erred in applying Barker v. Wingo/Doggett balancing and misweighing factors.
The court holds the Barker analysis requires correct presumptive prejudice timing and proper factual findings; the trial court’s findings were not fully supported and its reasoning was flawed.
The appellate court vacates the dismissal order and remands for reconsideration with properly supported findings and correct law.
The case-wide judgment is vacated and remanded for a Barker analysis consistent with Barker, Porter, and related Georgia authorities.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the delay from arrest to trial was presumptively prejudicial	Hartsfield argues delay exceeds presumptive prejudice threshold.	State concedes long delay; presumption weighs against it.	Yes; 63-month delay presumptively prejudicial.
Whether the second Barker factor—reason for delay—was properly characterized	Delay due to state negligence should be treated as benign rather than far from benign.	Trial court found delay was far from benign.	Trial court erred; reason should be treated as relatively benign.
Whether the third Barker factor—assertion of the right to speedy trial—was properly weighed	Hartsfield asserted rights late but mitigation factors should be considered.	Late assertion weighed strongly against defendant; mitigation acknowledged some factors.	Mitigation factors improperly weighed; late assertion should be weighed against him with proper context.
Whether the fourth Barker factor—prejudice to the defense—was properly established	Delay impaired defense because of lack of counsel.	Record does not support impairment claim; no proof of impaired witness-tracking.	Prejudice finding unsupported; no established impairment.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (framework for speedy-trial analysis with four Barker factors)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumptive prejudice and balancing framework in delay analysis)
Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52 (2008) (Georgia speedy-trial standard and Barker framework)
State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524 (2011) (abrogates improper findings and requires proper Barker analysis on remand)
Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730 (1994) (delay attributable to state negligence weighed as relatively benign if not deliberate)
Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782 (2000) (delay in asserting speedy-trial rights weighed against defendant)
Moses, 301 Ga. App. 315 (2009) (circumstances can mitigate delay in asserting speedy-trial rights)
Robinson v. State, 287 Ga. 265 (2010) (nine-month delay in asserting right weighed against defendant)
Nelloms v. State, 274 Ga. 179 (2001) (prejudice includes impairment of defense and time-related burdens)
Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338 (2009) (case-specific analysis of Barker factors)
Brannen v. State, 274 Ga. 454 (2001) (scope of weighting and mitigation considerations in speedy-trial analysis)