State v. Hart, 2020 UT App 25

Background:

Hart and an accomplice, Burwell, planned to pose as drug buyers and rob two sellers; during the attempted robbery an exchange of gunfire left one seller (Victim) dead and Hart injured.
Investigators found an extended Glock magazine, a 9mm casing, Hart’s blood trail, and Victim’s .45 handgun; Hart later was arrested in possession of a different 9mm handgun that did not match the casing from the scene.
Cousin (who loaned Hart a Glock) gave multiple inconsistent statements, at times admitting he lied to protect Hart and testifying that Hart said he shot someone; Cousin also stood to benefit at parole for cooperating.
The State initially noticed 404(b) evidence of a prior attempted robbery but agreed not to introduce it at trial; the court had previously ruled it admissible and an interlocutory appeal was dismissed when the State withheld the evidence.
At trial the State presented Gun Expert testimony that the casing matched a Glock and not the Taurus recovered from Victim; Cousin testified about loading the magazine and hearing Hart say he shot someone; Case Manager testified about blood-patterns placing Hart over Victim then moving west; a DNA analyst linked Hart’s DNA to a jacket later stipulated to be Hart’s, prompting a jury question during deliberations.
A jury convicted Hart of aggravated murder, obstruction of justice, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person; Hart appealed claiming four instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hart)	Held
1) Should counsel have moved for mistrial after Gun Expert referenced an “other firearm”?	Reference was vague, the court cured any risk by having witness say the other gun was a comparison firearm with no case connection.	Counsel was ineffective for not moving for a mistrial because jurors could infer the other gun was Hart’s.	No — mistrial would have been futile; testimony was made innocuous and cured.
2) Should counsel have moved for mistrial after Cousin testified Hart had been in prison and counsel highlighted that fact?	Defense reasonably used incarceration evidence to impeach Cousin’s motives/opportunity; moving for mistrial risked admitting 404(b) prior-act evidence on retrial.	Counsel was ineffective for eliciting and emphasizing Hart’s incarceration, which prejudiced the jury.	No — counsel had a strategic basis to highlight incarceration to discredit Cousin; mistrial risked worse evidence on retrial.
3) Should counsel have moved for mistrial after the jury asked whose jacket had the DNA?	The jacket ownership was stipulate and trivial to the overall case; a mistrial would have been futile.	Counsel was ineffective for not seeking mistrial because jury confusion undermined fairness.	No — the jacket evidence was minor, not outcome-determinative, and the court’s clarification was adequate.
4) Should counsel have objected under rule 702 to Case Manager’s blood-pattern testimony?	Counsel had strategic reasons to leave the testimony (use it to attack investigation quality) and objections risked allowing the State to bolster the witness with foundation.	Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to purportedly unqualified expert testimony.	No — there was a conceivable strategic basis for not objecting and no clear showing the witness lacked qualification.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes the two-part ineffective-assistance standard)
State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 2012) (mistrial appropriate only to prevent injustice; harmless/curative statements may defeat mistrial)
State v. Clark, 89 P.3d 162 (Utah 2004) (strong presumption counsel’s assistance adequate; performance not deficient where strategic basis exists)
State v. Kelley, 1 P.3d 546 (Utah 2000) (failure to raise futile objections is not ineffective assistance)
State v. Bedell, 322 P.3d 697 (Utah 2014) (strategic use of potentially prejudicial evidence to undermine prosecution can be reasonable)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (addresses circumstances where counsel’s failure can make process presumptively unreliable)