State v. Harry W. Brown, 140 A.3d 768

Background

In 1996 Brown pleaded nolo contendere to multiple counts of child sexual offenses and received a 45-year sentence, with 25 years suspended and probation plus sex-offender conditions.
Brown’s parole supervision transferred from Rhode Island (sending state) to Pennsylvania (receiving state) under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS); Pennsylvania imposed additional supervisory conditions (e.g., no internet/social‑networking, no sexually explicit materials, restrictions on relationships with caretakers of minors).
Brown repeatedly violated Pennsylvania’s conditions (use of dating/social‑networking sites; possession of pornographic materials and a photo of a school‑aged girl) and admitted violations in Pennsylvania via a signed waiver form.
Pennsylvania notified Rhode Island; Brown was returned and Rhode Island filed a Rule 32(f) probation‑violation report. At the Superior Court hearing the state introduced Pennsylvania’s evidence (including the waiver form) and the hearing justice adjudicated Brown a probation violator and executed eight years of the suspended sentence.
The hearing justice also imposed two additional probation conditions (no contact with persons under 18; no computer use). Brown appealed contending (inter alia) that ICAOS Rule 4.103-1 required a different result, that the waiver/evidence was improperly treated, that the executed sentence was excessive, and that the new conditions were unauthorized.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Brown's Argument	Held
Scope of ICAOS Rule 4.103-1 — does it require a sending‑state court to automatically adjudicate a probation violation when a receiving‑state condition is breached?	Rule 4.103-1 requires the sending state to give the same effect to receiving‑state condition violations, so a Superior Court must treat such breaches as probation violations.	Rule 4.103-1 cannot compel a sending‑state court to automatically adjudicate probation violation; rule targets the sending‑state probation/paroling authority, not the court.	The rule binds the sending‑state probation/paroling authority to take punitive action, but it does not impose an automatic duty on a sending‑state court to adjudicate violation; courts retain discretion to determine whether conduct amounts to failure to keep the peace and be of good behavior.
Whether Brown’s conduct amounted to failure to keep the peace and remain of good behavior (sufficiency of evidence)	Brown breached conditions he voluntarily accepted; his repeated, knowing violations and possession of sexual materials (including a child photo) support adjudication.	The conduct was noncriminal, ordinary behavior that does not equate to failure to keep the peace.	Court affirmed: conduct (willful repeated breaches, concealment, pornographic materials with a child photo) provided reasonable, non‑arbitrary basis to find failure to keep the peace and be of good behavior.
Admissibility/effect of Pennsylvania waiver and receiving‑state evidence at Rhode Island hearing	Signed waiver constitutes substantial evidence of violation; receiving‑state findings/waiver may be admitted without live testimony.	Waiver validity and voluntariness require more concrete proof; absence of Pennsylvania witnesses undermines reliability.	Court did not decide a fixed rule for all cases but held that receiving‑state records and waivers can be admitted if reliable and if good‑cause considerations support limited confrontation; here testimonial and documentary evidence sufficed, so admission and reliance were proper.
Authority to impose new probation conditions at violation hearing	New conditions were reasonable to protect public safety.	Hearing justice lacked statutory authority to impose additional conditions beyond those the original sentencing justice set.	Vacated imposition of two new conditions: a revoking justice lacks statutory power to add new probation conditions not originally imposed by the sentencing court. Execution of eight years of suspended sentence affirmed (no abuse of discretion).

Key Cases Cited

M.F. v. New York Exec. Dep’t Div. of Parole, 640 F.3d 491 (2d Cir.) (ICAOS has force of federal law)
State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479 (R.I. 2013) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Gibson, 126 A.3d 427 (R.I. 2015) (state’s burden at probation‑violation hearing; deferential review of adjudication)
State v. Vieira, 883 A.2d 1146 (R.I. 2005) (probation violation need not be criminal conduct)
State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240 (R.I. 2008) (prior sex offenses inform assessment of good behavior at violation hearing)
Critelli v. State, 962 So.2d 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (interpreting scope of Rule 4.103-1; holding transfer applicant effectively modified probation)
State v. McKinnon‑Conneally, 101 A.3d 875 (R.I. 2014) (factors for how much of suspended sentence to execute)
State v. Bernard, 925 A.2d 936 (R.I. 2007) (due‑process rights and hearsay/confrontation considerations at probation hearings)