450 P.3d 499
Or.2019Background
- Defendant Harrison was stopped by police; she stepped out of the car leaving the driver-side door open. An officer observed a handgun tucked barrel-down in the interior pocket of the driver-side door, with the handle protruding; the pocket was below the window and armrest and below the level of the driver’s seat.
- Harrison was charged under ORS 166.250(1)(b) for knowingly possessing a handgun that was "concealed and readily accessible" within a vehicle.
- At trial Harrison moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the gun was not "concealed" as a matter of law; the motion was denied and she was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
- Harrison also requested a special jury instruction clarifying that "knowingly" required awareness that the handgun was concealed; the trial court declined and gave a slightly different instruction.
- The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) the meaning of "concealed" in ORS 166.250(1)(b), whether the evidence was sufficient, and (2) whether the court erred in refusing Harrison’s requested jury instruction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Harrison) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition/sufficiency: What does "concealed" mean in ORS 166.250(1)(b), and was the evidence sufficient? | A gun is "concealed" if it is shielded from the vision of some persons who may come into contact with the vehicle; need not be hidden from all. | "Concealed" should mean hidden from ordinary vantage in ordinary interactions (or require intent to hide); if any ordinary vantage point could see it, it is not concealed. | "Concealed" means placement that would fail to give reasonable notice of the gun’s presence through ordinary observation to a person coming into contact with the occupants and communicating in the typical manner (e.g., through an open window). Evidence (gun in door pocket below armrest) was sufficient. |
| Jury instruction: Does "knowingly" modify "concealed," and did the trial court err by refusing Harrison’s requested instruction? | The trial court’s instruction was legally correct and adequately informed the jury. | Requested instruction made explicit that "knowingly" means awareness that the gun is concealed and readily accessible; refusal could allow juror misinterpretation. | No error. The given instruction was legally correct, covered the substance of the requested instruction, and jurors are presumed to follow correct instructions. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Briney, 345 Or 505 (Or. 2008) (history of Oregon concealed-weapons law and legislative purpose: notice to those who may come into contact with a weapon bearer)
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160 (Or. 2009) (methodology: consider text, context, and legislative history)
- PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or 606 (Or. 1993) (ordinary-meaning presumption for undefined statutory terms)
- State v. Riley, 240 Or 521 (Or. 1965) (prior discussion that concealment evidence may include efforts to hide a weapon)
- Laubach v. Industrial Indem. Co., 286 Or 217 (Or. 1979) (trial court need not give a requested instruction that merely enlarges on a correct instruction given)
- Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth, 354 Or 150 (Or. 2013) (requested-instruction standard: substance covered by other instructions is not reversible error)
- State v. Smith, 310 Or 1 (Or. 1990) (presumption that jurors follow their instructions)