State v. Harris
1607020376
| Del. Super. Ct. | Sep 21, 2021Background
- Defendant Jordan O. Harris was convicted by a jury of firearm/ammunition possession by a prohibited person, resisting arrest, DUI, and other traffic offenses; sentenced to 25 years (suspended after 7) and probation.
- Harris filed a pro se postconviction Rule 61 motion (with counsel appointed) alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to file a suppression motion challenging a warrantless stop/seizure.
- Trial evidence (MVR and officer testimony) showed a car stopped at ~11 p.m. in front of the residence of a wanted person; as an officer approached and used the strobe function of her flashlight, the car abruptly sped away at high speed through a residential neighborhood; officers then activated emergency equipment and pursued.
- Commissioner issued a Report recommending the claim be ruled procedurally barred and, alternatively, denied on the merits (counsel competent; no prejudice from not filing suppression motion).
- The Superior Court rejected the procedural-bar recommendation (citing Green v. State) but reviewed the claim de novo and denied relief on Strickland grounds: counsel’s decision was objectively reasonable and Harris suffered no prejudice because (1) the court treated the seizure as occurring when emergency equipment was activated during the chase and the subsequent high-speed flight and connection to a wanted person supplied reasonable suspicion, and (2) even if the seizure occurred at the flashlight activation, the driver’s flight provided an independent basis to stop.
Issues
| Issue | Harris' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 61(i)(3) procedurally bars the ineffective-assistance claim | Rule 61(i)(3) does not bar because ineffective-assistance claims cannot be raised at trial/direct appeal | Rule argued procedural bar below (but State did not press here) | Court: Not procedurally barred (cites Green v. State) |
| Whether officer’s use of flashlight strobe constituted a Terry seizure | Strobe activation was a seizure; no reasonable articulable suspicion existed at that moment | Seizure did not occur until officers activated emergency equipment during the ensuing chase | Court: No seizure at flashlight activation; seizure occurred once emergency equipment was activated during pursuit |
| Whether trial counsel was objectively unreasonable for not filing a suppression motion | Counsel should have filed because seizure at flashlight made suppression viable | Counsel’s decision was reasonable given the evidence and lack of a developed suppression record | Court: Counsel’s decision was objectively reasonable |
| Whether Harris was prejudiced by failure to file suppression motion (reasonable probability of success) | A suppression motion would have had a reasonable probability of success | The record showed independent reasonable suspicion (stop at wanted person’s residence + high-speed flight); motion would have failed | Court: No prejudice; motion would not likely have succeeded |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing ineffective-assistance standard)
- Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 (Del. 2020) (ineffective-assistance claims are not categorically barred by Rule 61(i)(3))
- Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280 (Del. 2008) (applying Terry framework to vehicle stops)
- Flowers v. State, 195 A.3d 18 (Del. 2018) (defining seizure—reasonable person not free to leave)
- Murray v. State, 213 A.3d 571 (Del. 2019) (reasonable articulable suspicion requires specific, articulable facts)
- United States v. Hayden, 759 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2014) (shining a flashlight is not necessarily a seizure)
- United States v. Douglass, 467 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2006) (use of a flashlight generally not coercive)
- Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345 (Del. 1991) (explaining the need for more than a vague hunch for reasonable suspicion)