State v. Harris
296 Neb. 317
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1999 Jack E. Harris was convicted of first-degree murder and weapon use for the 1995 killing of Anthony Jones; key trial testimony implicated Harris and accomplice Howard “Homicide” Hicks.
- A 1996 police interview report by Officer Leland Cass (showing Harris knew Hicks) was not produced pretrial; appellate proceedings repeatedly addressed that nondisclosure.
- Postconviction proceedings (multiple motions and appeals) raised newly obtained affidavits from Terrell McClinton and Curtis Allgood (2006–2007) alleging Hicks acted alone and describing Hicks’ presence/behavior the night of the murder.
- Harris also alleged the prosecutor misrepresented or failed to disclose the true plea agreement between the State and Hicks at trial.
- At an evidentiary hearing (2013) the district court found the State did not know of McClinton or Allgood’s potentially exculpatory information pretrial and denied relief; the Nebraska Supreme Court found errors in the court’s analysis and remanded in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harris) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brady duty extends to evidence learned after conviction (McClinton) | State must disclose exculpatory information it receives postconviction | Brady does not apply after a fair trial and conviction; postconviction remedies/safety valves suffice | Brady does not apply postconviction; denial of relief on McClinton claim affirmed |
| Whether State suppressed police interview information from Allgood (police knew; prosecutor may not) | Allgood’s statements to police were favorable (exculpatory/impeaching) and the prosecutor had a duty to learn/disclose them | Allgood’s statements were not materially exculpatory and would not show Harris’ innocence | District court applied wrong standard; remand required to assess materiality and cumulative effect with other suppressed evidence |
| Whether prosecutor misrepresented or failed to disclose Hicks’ plea agreement | Prosecutor misrepresented or allowed misrepresentation of Hicks’ plea terms; failure to disclose was Brady-impeachment evidence | State did not concede procedural or pleading limits at hearing; argued claims were barred or not shown | District court failed to rule on these claims; remand for clarification and adjudication required |
| Whether ineffective assistance claims based on failure to call Allgood/McClinton are procedurally barred | Trial counsel ineffective for not investigating/ calling these witnesses if aware | Defense has not shown counsel knew of witnesses; some claims were not raised timely | New ineffective-assistance theory (raised later) is procedurally barred; other IAC claims depend on remand factual findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable exculpatory and impeachment evidence)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard: reasonable probability of different result)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (cumulative-materiality test; undermining confidence in verdict)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady three-part test: favorable, suppressed, prejudicial)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (Brady does not extend to postconviction disclosure obligations after a fair trial)