State v. Harris
296 Neb. 317
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1999 Jack E. Harris was convicted of first-degree murder (1995 death of Anthony Jones) after testimony implicating Harris and accomplice Howard “Homicide” Hicks; officer Leland Cass testified Harris had identified Hicks by nickname.
- Postconviction proceedings focused on alleged nondisclosure by the State of several items: (a) a police report by Officer Cass (previously litigated), (b) statements by witness Curtis Allgood to police in 1996–97, and (c) an affidavit from Terrell McClinton (reporting Hicks’ confession) first conveyed to authorities in 2004.
- At a 2013 evidentiary hearing the court received Allgood’s testimony and McClinton’s 2007 affidavit; record also showed a police fax in July 1999 that included 29 pages to the prosecutor (some pages missing from the record) and a notice to endorse Agnew and Allgood.
- The district court denied relief in 2016, finding (a) the prosecutor lacked knowledge of McClinton and Allgood’s potentially exculpatory information before trial, and (b) no ineffective assistance shown; the court did not address Harris’ claims about the nature of Hicks’ plea agreement.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed denial as to McClinton (posttrial disclosure not governed by Brady/Osborne) but reversed/remanded as to Allgood and the plea-agreement claims because the district court applied incorrect standards and failed to consider cumulative materiality and impeachment value of Allgood’s statements; one ineffective-assistance theory not raised timely and thus procedurally barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State suppressed Allgood’s 1996–97 statements (Brady) | Harris: Allgood told police Hicks was at his house the night of the murder; nondisclosure deprived defense of impeachment/alibi corroboration and was material | State: Allgood’s statements were not exculpatory or impeaching; even if Hicks visited Allgood, that does not show Harris was not involved | Court: Remanded — district court applied wrong standard (focused only on prosecutor’s knowledge); must evaluate whether statements were favorable, suppressed, and material cumulatively in light of trial evidence |
| Whether McClinton’s 2004 affidavit triggered Brady disclosure | Harris: McClinton reported Hicks’ confession to police in 2004 and State should have disclosed postconviction-acquired evidence | State: Prosecutor had no knowledge pretrial; Brady does not require disclosure of evidence learned after a fair trial (Osborne) | Held: Affirmed — Brady does not apply to evidence the State first learned of after conviction and sentencing; postconviction statutory/ethical remedies differ |
| Whether prosecutor misrepresented or allowed misrepresentation of Hicks’ plea agreement | Harris: Prosecutor misrepresented the plea terms and failed to disclose true plea agreement, which would impeach Hicks | State: Procedural objections and contested factual record regarding what was disclosed or represented at Hicks’ proceedings | Held: Reversed/remanded — district court failed to address these claims; court must clarify whether it ruled on plea-agreement claims and, if not, evaluate materiality and cumulative prejudice |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to investigate/call Allgood or McClinton | Harris: Trial counsel should have investigated Allgood after endorsement and called Allgood/McClinton to impeach Hicks and support alibi | State: No evidence counsel had knowledge of the exculpatory information; some claims were not pled timely | Held: Some ineffective-assistance theories were procedurally barred (not raised in timely motion); factual finding that counsel did not know the information is not clearly erroneous, but other theories (failure to investigate after endorsement) were not raised and thus barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose favorable exculpatory and impeachment evidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (materiality is whether suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the verdict; cumulative assessment)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (materiality standard: reasonable probability result would be different)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (three components of Brady: favorable, suppressed, prejudice)
- District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (Brady obligations do not extend to postconviction evidence learned after a fair trial)