State v. Harris
296 Neb. 317
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1999 Jack E. Harris was convicted of first-degree murder and weapon use for the 1995 killing of Anthony Jones; co-defendant Howard “Homicide” Hicks testified against him.
- A 1996 Omaha police interview report by Officer L. Cass (showing Harris knew Hicks) was not timely provided to defense; the state later admitted it failed to produce the Cass report before trial.
- Postconviction proceedings raised new evidence and nondisclosure claims based on: (1) affidavits from Terrell McClinton and Curtis Allgood asserting Hicks confessed or acted alone; and (2) alleged undisclosed / misrepresented terms of Hicks’ plea agreement.
- At an evidentiary hearing (2013) Allgood testified he told a police investigator in 1996–97 that he saw Hicks with Bass the night of the murder and described Hicks’ agitated arrival that night; McClinton’s contact with authorities occurred in 2004.
- The district court denied postconviction relief, finding no prosecutorial knowledge of McClinton and concluding no suppression by the State regarding Allgood; the court did not resolve claims about Hicks’ plea agreement and applied an incorrect legal standard to Allgood’s-materiality claim.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed denial as to McClinton (posttrial disclosure not required) but reversed/remanded as to Allgood and for clarification whether the plea-agreement claims were considered, instructing proper Brady/Kyles cumulative-materiality analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Harris' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brady/materiality applies to evidence the State learned postconviction (McClinton) | Brady duty is ongoing; State must disclose exculpatory evidence learned after conviction | Brady does not apply postconviction; posttrial disclosures governed by ethics and state procedures | Denied relief on this claim; Brady does not require disclosure of evidence learned after a fair trial (Osborne controls) |
| Whether the prosecutor suppressed material favorable evidence known to police (Allgood) | Allgood told police in 1996–97 that Hicks was at his house that night; that information was favorable/impeaching and material; prosecutor had duty to learn and disclose | Allgood’s statements were not exculpatory or impeaching enough to help defense; prosecutor lacked knowledge of content | Court erred: prosecutor has duty to learn police-held favorable evidence; remanded to assess whether Allgood’s statements were favorable and materially undermined confidence in the verdict (Bagley/Kyles analysis) |
| Whether the court applied correct standard evaluating materiality and cumulative prejudice | Court applied incorrect focus on prosecutor’s direct knowledge and failed to evaluate impeachment value and cumulative effect with prior suppression (Cass report) | N/A (court relied on lack of proof of knowledge) | Reversed/remanded for proper application: consider impeachment/exculpatory nature, materiality under "reasonable probability" standard, and cumulative effect with other suppressed evidence |
| Whether claims about Hicks’ plea agreement were considered and whether nondisclosure/misrepresentation warrants relief | Prosecutor misrepresented or allowed misrepresentation of Hicks’ plea deal; true terms would impeach Hicks and affect sentencing/credibility; State failed to disclose plea terms | Procedural bar and record issues; court did not have clear pleading; State argued procedural defenses | Remanded for clarification whether the district court addressed plea-agreement claims; if suppressed, court must assess materiality cumulatively with other suppressed evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose favorable evidence)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (materiality standard: reasonable probability outcome would differ)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (cumulative-assessment of suppressed evidence; undermining confidence in verdict)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (three components of Brady violation: favorable, suppressed, prejudicial)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard applied for materiality analogy)
- District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (Brady does not apply postconviction; posttrial disclosure governed by state procedures)