State v. Harris
296 Neb. 317
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1999 Jack E. Harris was convicted of first-degree murder and weapon use for the 1995 killing of Anthony Jones; co-defendant Howard “Homicide” Hicks testified against him.
- Police officer Leland Cass interviewed Harris in 1996; Cass’s undisclosed report (showing Harris knew Hicks) was later central to appeals and postconviction proceedings.
- Postconviction proceedings raised newly discovered evidence affidavits (McClinton and Allgood) asserting Hicks had acted alone and had admitted shooting Jones.
- Allgood testified at a 2013 evidentiary hearing that Hicks arrived at his home the night of the killing, muddy and agitated, and later told Bass “it was handled”; Allgood also said he had spoken with police in 1996–97 but did not disclose all details then.
- The district court denied postconviction relief, finding no prosecutorial suppression as to McClinton and reasoning the prosecution lacked knowledge of Allgood’s exculpatory statements; it did not address Harris’s claims about Hicks’ plea agreement.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded: it upheld denial as to McClinton (postconviction Brady inapplicable to evidence learned after conviction), but found the district court applied the wrong standard regarding Allgood and failed to clarify which postconviction motion it ruled on, requiring further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor suppressed favorable evidence (Allgood statements) in violation of Brady | Allgood told police in 1996–97 that Hicks was at his house the night of the murder; nondisclosure deprived Harris of impeachment/alibi evidence | Prosecutor did not possess or know Allgood’s exculpatory statements before trial; nothing to disclose | Reversed/remanded: court applied wrong standard by focusing only on prosecutor’s personal knowledge and failed to assess whether Allgood’s statements were potentially exculpatory/impeaching and material in light of trial evidence |
| Whether Brady/due-process requires disclosure of evidence learned by State after conviction (McClinton) | Harris: State has ongoing duty to disclose favorable evidence learned postconviction; McClinton’s 2004 information should have been disclosed | Brady obligations do not extend postconviction; Osborne and precedent limit posttrial disclosure duties; Nebraska statutes/procedures control remedies | Affirmed: Brady does not require postconviction disclosure of evidence the State first learns after a fair trial and conviction; denial as to McClinton proper |
| Whether court properly considered cumulative materiality (multiple suppressed items, incl. Cass report) | Suppression should be evaluated cumulatively with known Cass-report nondisclosure | Evaluation should consider whether each item was material; trial record context matters | Court directed that if suppression of Allgood or plea-agreement evidence is found, materiality must be assessed cumulatively with prior Cass suppression |
| Whether trial counsel ineffective for not calling Allgood/McClinton | If counsel knew of witnesses or their info, failing to call them was ineffective and prejudicial | No evidence counsel knew of their statements; ineffective-assistance claims not proven; some new ineffective-claims were not pleaded timely | Remanded/affirmed in part: ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s knowledge was procedurally barred if not raised; court’s factual finding that counsel lacked knowledge of McClinton/Allgood was not clearly erroneous, but related claims require proper consideration on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable/exculpatory and impeachment evidence)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard: reasonable probability result would differ)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality focuses on whether suppression undermines confidence in outcome; cumulative effect)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (three components of Brady: favorable, suppressed, prejudice)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective-assistance standard for performance and prejudice)
- District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (Brady does not extend to postconviction disclosure of evidence learned after a fair trial)