State v. Harris, 296 Neb. 317

Background

In 1999 Jack E. Harris was convicted of first-degree murder and related weapon charges for the 1995 killing of Anthony Jones; Howard “Homicide” Hicks testified against Harris and implicated him.
A 1996 police interview report by Officer Leland Cass (showing Harris knew Hicks) was not provided to defense before trial; prior appeals produced evidentiary hearings addressing nondisclosure of that report.
Postconviction, Harris produced affidavits from Terrell McClinton (who said Hicks confessed to him years after the trial) and Curtis Allgood (who said Hicks arrived muddy and agitated the night of the murder and spoke with Bass), alleging the State suppressed these leads.
At a 2013 evidentiary hearing, evidence showed the police faxed 29 pages to the prosecutor in 1999 (only some were produced), and the prosecutor endorsed—but then declined to call—witnesses including Allgood; the prosecutor testified she relied on police to screen sensitive gang-unit information.
The district court denied postconviction relief, finding no suppression regarding McClinton (his information postdated conviction) and concluding the record showed no pretrial knowledge of Allgood’s exculpatory statements; the court did not address Harris’s claim about the State’s representations concerning Hicks’ plea agreement.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded: it upheld denial as to McClinton but held the district court applied the wrong standard regarding Allgood (prosecutor’s duty to learn police-held favorable evidence), and remanded for the court to clarify whether it ruled on the plea-agreement claims and to assess materiality cumulatively with the Cass suppression.

Issues

Issue	Harris' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the State violated Brady by failing to disclose Allgood’s statements to police that could corroborate Harris’ alibi or impeach Hicks	Allgood’s prior statements to police were favorable (exculpatory/impeaching); nondisclosure prejudiced Harris and undermines confidence in verdict	Any statements showed at most that Hicks (not Harris) was at Allgood’s house; they were not materially exculpatory and the prosecutor lacked knowledge	Court held the district court applied the wrong standard—prosecutor has a duty to learn police-held favorable evidence; remanded to evaluate whether Allgood’s statements were material and impeaching and to consider cumulative prejudice with other suppressed evidence
Whether Brady requires disclosure of favorable evidence learned by the State after conviction (McClinton’s 2004 information)	Harris urged an ongoing Brady-like duty to disclose exculpatory information learned postconviction	State argued Brady does not apply posttrial; ethical duties may exist but not a constitutional Brady duty after a fair trial	Court held Brady does not apply postconviction per Osborne; denial as to McClinton affirmed
Whether the district court erred by not addressing Harris’ claim that the prosecutor misrepresented or allowed misrepresentation of Hicks’ plea agreement	Harris alleged the prosecutor failed to disclose the true terms of Hicks’ plea deal and/or allowed Hicks to misstate it, which was impeaching material	State defended procedural posture and argued issues were not properly before the court	Court found the record unclear whether the court addressed plea-agreement claims and remanded for clarification and, if necessary, ruling on those claims
Whether Harris’ ineffective-assistance claim (failure to investigate/ call Allgood/McClinton) is procedurally barred	Harris argued trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating Allgood after endorsement and for failing to call these witnesses if known	State argued claims available earlier were not timely raised; some claims were not presented in the proper postconviction pleading	Court held a new failure-to-investigate claim not raised in the third amended motion is procedurally barred; prior court finding that counsel lacked knowledge of Allgood/McClinton was not clearly erroneous

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable exculpatory and impeachment evidence)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality is whether suppressed evidence undermines confidence in outcome; consider cumulative effect)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) ("reasonable probability" standard for materiality applies to undisclosed favorable evidence)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (sets out three components of a Brady claim: favorable, suppressed, prejudice)
Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist., 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (Brady does not impose a constitutional duty to disclose evidence learned after a fair trial in postconviction proceedings)