State v. Harrell / Wilson, 297 P.3d 461

Background

Two criminal cases consolidated: defendants sought to waive jury trial under Article I, section 11, Oregon Constitution; trial courts refused consent and juries convicted.
Harrell: waiver tendered during jury deliberations; prosecutor objected; trial court said no discretion without prosecutor agreement; convictions followed; CA affirmed; Supreme Court reverses and remands for reconsideration.
Wilson: pre-trial jury waiver request; no written waiver shown; trial court refused consent based on perceived objection; defendant tried by jury and convicted; CA affirmed; Supreme Court reverses and remands for reconsideration.
Court analyzes the text, history, and context of the jury waiver proviso, including the 1932 amendment added to Article I, §11, and related cases Wagner and Baker.
Majority adopts a framework where trial court discretion to consent to a jury waiver is guided by purposes of speed, economy, and protection of rights, and by the prosecutor’s expressed preferences, not by pure subjectivity.
Remands direct the circuit courts to reconsider the waivers in light of the opinion; if consent should not have been withheld, convictions may be reversed and new trials ordered.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What governs the trial court's discretion to consent to a jury waiver?	State argues discretion is broad and not limited to written voluntariness alone.	Harrell/Wilson contend discretion should be bounded by text/history and factors like economy and prosecutor input.	Discretion bounded by text/history; guided by economy, rights protection, and prosecutor's input.
May the prosecutor's preference legitimately influence the court's decision to consent to a waiver?	State argues prosecutor preferences may inform the court’s decision under Baker.	Harrell/Wilson urge the judge must exercise independent discretion, not delegate to the prosecutor.	Judicial discretion must be independent and not delegated to the prosecutor; prosecutor input is but one factor.
Is withholding consent based solely on prosecutor objection error?	State asserts the prosecutor's position can justify withholding consent.	Harrell/Wilson assert consent cannot be denied purely because of a prosecutor's objection without independent weighing.	Error when consent is withheld solely on prosecutor objection without independent, reasoned analysis.
Does timing of the waiver request affect the validity of consent to the waiver?	State contends timing may be considered as part of continuity and economy.	Harrell argues timing should not bar consideration; waivers can occur at various stages subject to proper discretion.	Timing is a permissible consideration within a proper discretion framework, not a per se bar to waiver.
What is the proper remedy when a trial court erred in denying a jury waiver?	Remand to reconsider with correct framework; if proper, reversal may be required.	Remand to allow proper exercise of discretion; if consent should not have been withheld, acquittals or new trials may follow.	Remand to reconsider; if consent improper, convictions may be reversed and new trial or acquittal ordered.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115 (1988) (history of jury waiver provision in Oregon)
State v. Baker, 328 Or 355 (1999) (trial judge should consider prosecutor's preferences in waiver decision)
State v. Barber, 343 Or 525 (2007) (written waiver required for jury waiver under Article I, §11)
Patton v. United States, 281 US 276 (1930) (waiver of mode of trial permissible with court and government consent; discretion required)
Singer v. United States, 380 US 24 (1965) (federal rule conditioning waiver of jury trial on government and court consent)
Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or 551 (1994) (interpretive framework for constitutional amendments adopted by initiative)
State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282 (2000) (discretionary decisions must be within a range of legally correct outcomes)