State v. Hardtke
183 Wash. 2d 475
| Wash. | 2015Background
- Defendant Frederick Hardtke was charged with multiple domestic-violence–related felonies and released on conditions including abstaining from alcohol and posting a bond.
- The court modified release: Hardtke posted a reduced $3,000 bond on condition he wear a transdermal alcohol detection (TAD) bracelet; the county arranged and paid for the monitoring pending trial.
- Hardtke objected to being required to pay for the TAD monitoring but complied and wore the device; the bracelet registered several alcohol violations leading to bond forfeiture and a higher bond.
- Hardtke pleaded guilty to amended charges; at sentencing the court ordered him to reimburse the county $3,972 for the pretrial TAD monitoring, labeled as "restitution." He appealed only that cost imposition.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed based on CrR 3.2 authority for release conditions; the Washington Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether RCW 10.01.160 or CrR 3.2 authorizes imposing such costs and in what amount.
Issues
| Issue | Hardtke's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether cost of pretrial electronic alcohol monitoring is a recoverable cost under RCW 10.01.160 | TAD monitoring is "pretrial supervision," so any court-ordered cost is limited by RCW 10.01.160 to $150 | The cost is an "expense specially incurred by the state in prosecuting the defendant," not pretrial supervision, so higher recovery is allowed; alternatively, it derives from CrR 3.2 release conditions | The monitoring costs qualify as "pretrial supervision" under RCW 10.01.160, not "expenses specially incurred"; they are therefore subject to the $150 statutory cap |
| Whether CrR 3.2 authorizes imposition of the county's TAD monitoring costs on the defendant | (implicit) CrR 3.2 cannot override statutory cost limits; costs are substantive and governed by statute | CrR 3.2 conditions of release permit electronic monitoring and courts can require defendants to bear associated costs | Court rules are procedural; statutory law governs substantive cost authority. CrR 3.2 does not supersede RCW 10.01.160 limits |
| Whether the county’s payment arrangement makes this a third-party expense (like a bond fee) rather than a court-imposed cost | County-arranged monitoring that the court seeks to recoup is a court-imposed pretrial supervision cost, not a private third-party obligation | Analogizes to bail/bond fees where the defendant contracts with third parties and courts do not set those fees | Because the county itself provided/paid for the monitoring (not the defendant arranging third-party services), the cost was imposed by the court and falls under RCW 10.01.160 |
| Remedy for amounts exceeding statutory limit | Excess monitoring costs exceed the statutory cap and must be vacated or reduced to $150 | State argued cost imposition was lawful | The trial court exceeded statutory authority by imposing ~$3,972; remand to limit pretrial supervision costs to $150 |
Key Cases Cited
- Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., PS, 166 Wn.2d 974 (2009) (procedural court rules do not override substantive statutes)
- State v. Hayes, 182 Wn.2d 556 (2015) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- State v. Moon, 124 Wn. App. 190 (2004) (statutes authorizing costs are in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed)
- Utter v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 140 Wn. App. 293 (2007) (discussion of "expenses specially incurred" under a similar statutory framework)
- State v. Cawyer, 182 Wn. App. 610 (2014) (mislabeling a cost does not invalidate an otherwise proper cost)