State v. Hammonds
325 Ga. App. 815
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Defendant Kristen Ann Hammonds, a high school secretary and assistant junior varsity cheerleading coach, was indicted on six counts of sexual assault against a person in custody under OCGA § 16-6-5.1(b)(1).
- Alleged victims were three male students aged 17–19; none were on the cheerleading team Hammonds assisted.
- School principal testified Hammonds’s secretarial duties were strictly clerical; she had no disciplinary authority and could only report misconduct to administrators; any staff could prepare disciplinary referrals.
- Trial court granted Hammonds’s motion to dismiss and quash the indictment, finding she was not a teacher, principal, assistant principal, or administrator and lacked required supervisory/disciplinary authority.
- State appealed; appellate court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and applied strict construction against the State for penal statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a school "administrator" under OCGA § 16-6-5.1(b)(1) includes a secretary | Hammonds was an "administrator" because she worked at the school and could initiate disciplinary referrals | Hammonds’s secretarial duties were clerical and do not fit ordinary meaning of "administrator" | Not an administrator; secretary is clerical, not within the statute's specified class |
| Whether an assistant coach qualifies as a "teacher" or has supervisory authority over non-team students | State: as assistant cheer coach, Hammonds taught and thus could be a "teacher" under the statute | Hammonds: any authority as coach was limited to team members; no supervisory control over the three students | Even if a teacher, no supervisory/disciplinary authority over these students; statute requires such authority |
| Whether statutory terms should be broadly construed to cover any school employee | State: broader reading would protect students and punish abusive staff | Hammonds: Penal statute must be strictly construed; Legislature distinguished "administrator" from "employee or agent" elsewhere in subsection | Court refuses to expand penal statute by implication; limited class in (b)(1) is teachers, principals, assistant principals, or other administrators |
| Whether a person who can initiate disciplinary referrals should be treated as having supervisory authority | State implied initiation equals authority | Hammonds: many staff can file referrals but lack actual disciplinary control | Filing referrals alone does not make one an administrator or give requisite supervisory authority |
Key Cases Cited
- Frix v. State, 298 Ga. App. 538 (standard of review: statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Luangkhot v. State, 292 Ga. 423 (courts apply ordinary meaning when statute is plain)
- Belvin v. State, 221 Ga. App. 114 (words assigned ordinary, common meaning; courts should not expand penal statutes)
- Hart v. State, 319 Ga. App. 749 (paraprofessional teaching in classroom could qualify as "teacher")
- Whitehead v. State, 295 Ga. App. 562 (teacher with direct supervisory control over student satisfied statute)
- Hedden v. State, 288 Ga. 871 (avoid constructions rendering language surplusage; criminal statutes strictly construed)