428 P.3d 849
Mont.2018Background
- Hamilton was tried and convicted by a jury of two counts of incest; sentenced to 100 years with 75 years suspended and 25 years parole ineligibility on each count.
- Pretrial: Hamilton did not challenge the statute defining "sexual contact" (§ 45-2-101(67)(a), MCA) at the omnibus hearing, arraignment, or during trial, and did not object to the jury instruction using that statutory definition.
- After verdict, a juror contacted defense counsel saying the jury instruction defining "sexual contact" was misleading; Hamilton then moved to dismiss, arguing the statutory definition was unconstitutionally vague (first raised post-trial).
- The district court held an evidentiary hearing with juror testimony, denied the motion as untimely and on the merits, then proceeded to sentencing where it considered a psychosexual evaluation and declined to apply the statutory exception to the mandatory 100‑year term.
- At sentencing the court orally stated the two sentences would run concurrently; the written judgment was silent on concurrency (silence defaults to consecutive sentences under § 46-18-401, MCA).
Issues
| Issue | Hamilton's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether Hamilton waived statutory vagueness challenges to the definition of "sexual contact" by not raising them before trial | Hamilton: statute is unconstitutionally vague (facial and as-applied); juror statement shows instruction was misleading so post-trial challenge is timely | State: challenges were capable of determination before trial and were therefore waived by failure to raise at omnibus or during trial | Court: Waived. Vagueness challenges were questions of law capable of determination pretrial; jury-instruction objection was untimely when first raised post-verdict |
| 2) Whether Hamilton waived sentencing objections by failing to raise them below (including failure to obtain written findings under § 46-18-223) | Hamilton: district court failed to make/write required findings for denying statutory exception and prejudged sentence | State: Hamilton failed to preserve objections; record contains the court's factual reasons so review is barred absent timely objection | Court: Waived to the extent not raising below; but court reviewed legality and found sentence within statutory parameters and district-court factual findings not clearly erroneous |
| 3) Whether the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding concurrency | Hamilton: written judgment omitted concurrency (which the court orally announced), causing potential imposition of consecutive sentences without his presence | State: concedes conflict and need to correct | Court: Oral pronouncement controls; written judgment conflicted and must be corrected to reflect concurrent sentences (remand) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Norquay, 248 P.3d 817 (Mont. 2011) (adoption of juror‑deadlock instruction at trial)
- State v. Reichmand, 243 P.3d 423 (Mont. 2010) (definition of "during trial" for timely objection purposes)
- State v. Tucker, 10 P.3d 832 (Mont. 2000) (refusal to remand where sentencing record supplies factual basis for denying mandatory‑minimum exception)
- State v. Sprinkle, 4 P.3d 1204 (Mont. 2000) (remand required where court failed to state written factual basis for denying mandatory‑minimum exception)
- State v. Lane, 957 P.2d 9 (Mont. 1998) (oral pronouncement controls over conflicting written judgment)
- State v. Johnson, 14 P.3d 480 (Mont. 2000) (same principle: oral sentence is legally effective)
- State v. VonBergen, 77 P.3d 537 (Mont. 2003) (district court discretion to control case progress and consider untimely motions)
- State v. Dixon, 998 P.2d 544 (Mont. 2000) (standards for vagueness challenges as applied)
