461 P.3d 1159
Wash.2020Background
- David Haggard had three prior California class C felony convictions (2002–2005) and was paroled in 2006.
- In 2011 Haggard pleaded guilty in Washington to misdemeanor disorderly conduct; the court deferred sentence, placed him on probation, and later dismissed the charge under RCW 3.66.067 after he complied with terms.
- In 2017 Haggard pleaded guilty to burglary and arson; at sentencing the trial court included his prior California class C felonies in his offender score, finding the 2011 dismissed misdemeanor interrupted the five-year SRA "washout" period (RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c)).
- The State and trial court treated a dismissed misdemeanor as a "conviction" for SRA purposes because Haggard did not obtain vacation under RCW 9.96.060; this yielded an offender score of six and higher standard terms.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Washington Supreme Court granted review and, in an en banc majority, affirmed the inclusion of the prior felonies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Haggard) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a dismissed misdemeanor under RCW 3.66.067 qualifies as a "conviction" for SRA/offender-score purposes | Dismissal (withdrawal of plea and entry of not guilty) erases the conviction and thus should not interrupt the five-year washout | The SRA definition of "conviction" focuses on the initial finding/acceptance of guilt; dismissal does not negate that finding for SRA purposes | A dismissed misdemeanor meets the SRA definition of "conviction" and can interrupt the washout period |
| Whether dismissal under RCW 3.66.067 is legally equivalent to vacation under RCW 9.96.060 (i.e., whether dismissal alone removes a conviction from criminal history) | Dismissal should be treated as equivalent to vacation so the conviction would be omitted from criminal history without a separate vacation motion | Dismissal and vacation are distinct statutory procedures with different requirements and effects; only vacation (or similar statutes) removes convictions from criminal history | Dismissal and vacation are not legally equivalent; only a vacated conviction per RCW 9.96.060 (or listed alternatives) can be omitted from criminal history |
| Whether RCW 9.94A.525(2)(c) is ambiguous (invoking rule of lenity) and whether reversed convictions would still count | Literal reading raises odd results (e.g., temporarily convicted but later reversed convictions); ambiguity warrants construing the statute in defendant's favor | The statute is unambiguous when read with SRA definitions; reversed/overturned convictions are vacated by review and therefore do not remain for sentencing | Statute is not ambiguous; overturned convictions are effectively vacated and do not count; rule of lenity does not change the outcome |
| Whether precedent (Breazeale/Carrier) requires treating dismissed convictions as vacated | Relies on Breazeale to argue dismissal should clear records; cites legislative history absence of a misdemeanor "Breazeale fix" | Breazeale involved different statutory language; Carrier controls and clarifies that SRA focuses on initial finding of guilt, and legislature treats dismissal and vacation separately | Carrier and legislative history support holding that dismissal does not automatically equal vacation; dismissal does not remove a conviction from SRA criminal-history calculations |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 173 Wn.2d 791 (Wash. 2012) (pre-SRA dismissed convictions treated in context of SRA; Court clarified relationship between dismissal and vacation)
- State v. Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829 (Wash. 2001) (interpreting pre-SRA dismissal statute and its practical effect vis-à-vis vacation)
- State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815 (Wash. 2010) (statutory interpretation principles; breakdown of washout provision clauses)
- State v. Mutch, 171 Wn.2d 646 (Wash. 2011) (offender-score calculations reviewed de novo)
- State v. Whitaker, 112 Wn.2d 341 (Wash. 1989) (deferred sentence treated as conviction for SRA purposes)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Skylstad, 160 Wn.2d 944 (Wash. 2007) (reversed convictions treated as vacated)
- State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d 819 (Wash. 2006) (use of the term "vacate" when appellate reversal removes conviction)