State v. Gwynne, 231 N.E.3d 1109

Background

Over ~8 years Susan Gwynne stole sentimental and monetary items from elderly residents; she pled guilty to multiple burglary, theft, and misdemeanor counts.
At sentencing the trial court imposed multiple consecutive felony terms (three years for many burglaries, 12 months for thefts, etc.), made R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings, and imposed an aggregate 65‑year prison term.
The Fifth District twice expressed that 65 years was excessive but ultimately upheld the sentence on remand because it felt constrained by appellate standards; this Court previously issued Gwynne IV (Dec. 23, 2022) reversing the court of appeals and announcing that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings must consider the aggregate term and that appellate review is de novo under a clear‑and‑convincing framework.
The State moved for reconsideration, arguing the Court decided an unbriefed question and misread R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); the Court granted reconsideration, vacated Gwynne IV, and affirmed the Fifth District.
The Court on reconsideration held that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is plain: appellate courts must defer to trial‑court consecutive‑sentence findings and may modify only if they clearly and convincingly find the record does not support those findings.
A concurring opinion stressed a dispositive procedural point: the presentence‑investigation report (PSI) the trial court relied on was not in the appellate record, which limited meaningful review; dissenters continued to argue that the statute requires consideration of the aggregate term.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Gwynne)	Held
Does R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) require the trial and appellate courts to consider the aggregate prison term when making/reviewing consecutive‑sentence findings?	Majority on reconsideration: statute’s phrases mean simple consecutive service (one sentence after another); no separate aggregate‑term requirement.	Gwynne: the statute’s necessity and proportionality findings must account for the aggregate term actually imposed.	Held: Court rejected the aggregate‑term requirement and read “consecutive service/consecutive sentences” as running one sentence after another; aggregate consideration is not mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
What standard governs appellate review of consecutive‑sentence findings under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)? (de novo vs. deferential)	State: R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires deference; appellate court may modify only if it clearly and convincingly finds the record does not support the trial court’s findings.	Gwynne: appellate review should be de novo and must assess whether each consecutive sentence and the aggregate term are supported.	Held: Court held R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is unambiguous—appellate courts must not substitute judgment and may vacate/modify only if they clearly and convincingly find the record does not support the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings (i.e., a deferential negative clear‑and‑convincing standard).
Can an appellate court vacate some consecutive sentences but leave others (i.e., modify part of the stacking)?	State: statute limits appellate power; must defer unless clear and convincing that record does not support findings.	Gwynne: appellate courts should be able to reassess the necessity/proportionality of individual stacked terms and the aggregate.	Held: Court affirmed the Fifth District’s approach and result; it did not adopt a rule allowing piecemeal vacation where the appellate court could not clearly and convincingly find the trial court’s findings unsupported.
Does a missing PSI in the appellate record bar meaningful review of consecutive‑sentence findings?	State/concurring view: yes—the PSI was part of the trial court’s sentencing record; absence of that document in the appellate record precludes a clear‑and‑convincing finding that the record does not support the findings.	Gwynne: argued merits of aggregate and proportionality challenges; record omissions should not control outcome.	Held: Concurrence emphasized that the absent PSI prevented adequate appellate review on this record, supporting affirmance; the lead opinion also affirmed on statutory‑text grounds.

Key Cases Cited

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (defining "clear and convincing evidence")
Lincoln Properties, Inc. v. Goldslager, 18 Ohio St.2d 154 (de novo review means independent judgment)
State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463 (legislature provided meaningful appellate review of sentencing)
State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 (discussing appellate review under R.C. 2953.08 and evidentiary standards)
State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 (overview of S.B. 2 sentencing reforms)
State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, 75 Ohio St.3d 381 (standard for granting reconsideration)
State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289 (sentences within statutory range are not grossly disproportionate)
State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489 (procedures for reconsideration of this Court's decisions)