State v. Guzman, 305 Neb. 376

Background

Sept. 22–23, 2017: B.G. hosted a party, became intoxicated and reported multiple males sexually assaulted her; she later identified penetration by more than one male and reported repeated vaginal and oral penetration.
Guzman attended the party; he initially denied sexual contact but a forensic exam of his phone recovered videos showing penile-vaginal intercourse with B.G. and oral penetration.
Guzman was arrested; an October 2017 jail call to a third party (Thomas) asked that B.G. be told to drop charges, leading to a witness-tampering count.
A jury convicted Guzman of first-degree sexual assault (Class II felony) and tampering with a witness (Class IV felony); sentence: 12–20 years for sexual assault and a concurrent 2-year determinate sentence for tampering.
On appeal the Court (1) declined to consider a vague ineffective-assistance assignment, (2) rejected Guzman’s suppression, mistrial, and sufficiency claims, and (3) found plain error in imposing a determinate rather than statutorily required indeterminate sentence for the Class IV tampering conviction and remanded for resentencing.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Guzman’s Argument	Held
Motion to suppress: Did Guzman unambiguously invoke right to counsel during custodial interrogation?	Officers lawfully continued questioning after a non‑equivocal waiver; Guzman’s question about a lawyer was about the phone search, not an invocation.	Guzman contends his question “Can I talk to a lawyer first?” was a clear invocation requiring cessation and suppression.	Court: Invocation was ambiguous/equivocal; no suppression. Question was reasonable to interpret as about the search, not a request for counsel.
Motion for mistrial/prosecutorial misconduct for calling and impeaching Rodriguez	State: It legitimately called Rodriguez and impeached inconsistent testimony; no intent to improperly prejudice Guzman.	Guzman: Prosecutor called Rodriguez to elicit impeachment before defense could present exculpatory testimony.	Court: No prosecutorial misconduct; impeachment of own witness permissible; no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial.
Directed verdict / sufficiency of evidence	State: Evidence (victim testimony, party testimony, videos on Guzman’s phone) allowed reasonable juror to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt for both counts.	Guzman: Challenges credibility of victim and sufficiency re tampering (mere message relay).	Court: Evidence sufficient for sexual assault and tampering convictions; Guzman’s credibility attacks were for the jury.
Sentencing and State’s cross-appealability	State urged plain error and attempted a cross-appeal that court could not reach because State lacked statutory basis for cross-appeal when district court was trial court.	Guzman: Sentences not excessive; argued error not raised below.	Court: No abuse of discretion on sexual-assault sentence. But plain error: tampering sentence must be indeterminate by statute; determinate 2-year term vacated and remanded for resentencing. Also clarified State may not file a cross-appeal absent statutory authorization; plain-error review remains available.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing custodial‑interrogation warnings and related safeguards)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (invocation of right to counsel must be unambiguous to require cessation)
State v. Mrza, 302 Neb. 931 (2019) (direct‑appeal assignments of ineffective assistance must specifically allege deficient performance)
State v. Briggs, 303 Neb. 352 (2019) (plain‑error review for sentencing and requirement to impose indeterminate sentence where statute mandates)
State v. Kantaras, 294 Neb. 960 (2016) (appellate power to remand for imposition of lawful sentence)
State v. Clifton, 296 Neb. 135 (2017) (suppression review: historical facts for clear‑error, constitutional questions reviewed de novo)