State v. Gutierrez-Medina, 442 P.3d 183

Background

Defendant drove under the influence and struck a pedestrian; pled guilty to DUII and third-degree assault (recklessly causing serious physical injury by means of a dangerous weapon).
Trial court ordered nearly $155,000 in restitution for the victim's medical expenses; defendant sought to reduce restitution by evidence of the victim's comparative fault.
Trial court refused to apply comparative fault; Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Oregon Supreme Court granted review.
Defendant argued that the civil-law doctrine of comparative fault (ORS 31.600(1)) should limit restitution because restitution references civil "economic damages."
The state (and majority) responded that a conviction for third-degree assault establishes a culpable mental state—awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial risk—that maps to civil "wanton" conduct, for which contributory negligence/comparative fault is not available.
The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that third-degree assault convictions foreclose the comparative-fault defense in a hypothetical civil action for the same injury; therefore restitution need not be reduced.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether comparative fault can reduce criminal restitution under ORS 137.106	Restitution statute incorporates civil limits on "economic damages," so comparative fault should apply	Comparative fault should reduce restitution because victim's negligence contributed to the loss	Court did not reach statutory preclusion issue; held comparative fault would be unavailable here because the assault conviction establishes culpability equivalent to civil "wanton" conduct
Whether a conviction for third‑degree assault establishes a culpable mental state that precludes comparative fault in a civil analog	N/A (state position)	Defendant argued his conduct equated to civil "gross negligence," so comparative fault would be available	Held conviction (recklessness: aware and consciously disregarded substantial risk) aligns with civil "wanton" conduct, barring comparative-fault defense
Whether civil comparative fault applies only where common-law contributory negligence would have applied	N/A	Defendant relied on the legislature’s incorporation of civil concepts into restitution determinations	Held ORS 31.600 implements comparative fault only where contributory negligence would have been an available defense pre-1971; comparative fault therefore inapplicable when defendant acted wantonly or intentionally
Whether the trial court erred in ordering full restitution	Defendant: trial court should reduce restitution by victim's fault	State: conviction and law support full restitution	Held trial court correctly refused to reduce restitution under the circumstances; judgment affirmed

Key Cases Cited

State v. Ramos, 358 Or. 581 (2016) (civil-law concepts guide restitution limits; foreseeability limits economic damages)
State v. Islam, 359 Or. 796 (2016) (civil damages principles used to measure restitution value)
Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Or. 34 (1956) (contributory negligence unavailable where defendant acted wantonly or intentionally)
Falls v. Mortensen, 207 Or. 130 (1956) (definition and scope of "wanton misconduct" for which contributory negligence is no defense)
Taylor v. Lawrence, 229 Or. 259 (1961) (approved Restatement definition of reckless/wanton misconduct)
Johnson v. Tilden, 278 Or. 11 (1977) (1975 amendment extended apportionment to actions where contributory negligence was appropriate)
Zumwalt v. Lindland, 239 Or. 26 (1964) (guest-passenger context equated statutory "gross negligence" with wanton misconduct)
State v. Hill, 298 Or. 270 (1984) (criminal recklessness requires awareness and conscious disregard; higher mental state than some civil standards)