State v. Guerrero
277 Or. App. 837
| Or. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Defendant had three successive court-appointed attorneys over ~1 year; each sought to withdraw after breakdowns with defendant; the court warned the defendant that the third appointed attorney would be his last.
- On the day of trial the third attorney (Bernstein) sought to withdraw citing an implied threat of a bar complaint and an unspecified ethical issue relating to defendant’s desire to testify; the court found an ethical conflict and granted withdrawal.
- The court concluded defendant implicitly waived his right to counsel by continued misconduct and declined to appoint substitute counsel; the court later conducted a limited colloquy explaining trial procedures and the difficulties of self-representation.
- Defendant elected to represent himself (did not ultimately testify) and was convicted of first-degree assault and unlawful use of a weapon.
- On appeal defendant argued the court erred by (1) finding an implicit waiver by misconduct without adequate warning that self-representation’s risks would follow, and (2) failing to appoint substitute counsel; he asserted the waiver was not knowing and intelligent.
- The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding the record did not show a knowing waiver of the right to counsel because the defendant was not adequately apprised of the risks of self-representation at the time the court relied on for implied waiver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant implicitly waived right to counsel by misconduct after being warned his next appointed attorney would be his last | Defendant’s repeated efforts to discharge appointed counsel and threats (bar complaints) justified an inference of implied waiver; warnings and defendant’s experience made waiver knowing | Court relied on the court’s later warning and argued the waiver was not knowing because defendant was not adequately warned of disadvantages of self-representation before the conduct relied on for waiver | Reversed: implicit waiver not shown to be "knowing"; warning that third attorney would be last was insufficient without evidence defendant appreciated risks of self-representation at that time |
| Whether trial court’s later colloquy about trial procedures cured lack of earlier advisement of risks | Later explanation demonstrated some awareness of complexity and risks | Colloquy came after the warning relied on for implied waiver and thus could not retroactively make the earlier waiver knowing | Court held the later colloquy was too late to supply the requisite knowledge at the critical time |
| Whether court abused discretion by not appointing substitute counsel after Bernstein withdrew | State: court balanced judicial efficiency and defendant-caused delay/misconduct; prior cases allow refusal to appoint where defendant created the situation | Defendant: refusal forced choice between counsel (but barred from testifying) or preserve right to testify but proceed pro se; lack of substitute counsel violated Article I, §11 | Because implicit waiver was not shown to be knowing, requiring pro se representation without appointing counsel was error requiring reversal |
| Whether prior cases (Spry, Hussin) permit denying substitute counsel when defendant repeatedly seeks new counsel | State: those decisions support denying substitute counsel to prevent manipulation/delay | Defendant: Langley requires review whether waiver was knowing when court grants withdrawal and does not appoint substitute counsel | Court: Langley supersedes prior approach; those cases don’t relieve court of ensuring waiver was knowing before requiring pro se trial |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Langley, 351 Or. 652 (Supreme Court) (implicit waiver by misconduct requires advance warning and knowing, intentional waiver review)
- State v. Meyrick, 313 Or. 125 (Supreme Court) (preferred practice: on-the-record colloquy explaining risks of self-representation)
- State v. Easter, 241 Or. App. 574 (explaining totality-of-circumstances approach and considering defendant’s prior experience)
- State v. Erb, 256 Or. App. 416 (defendant must understand risks; abstract awareness insufficient)
- State v. Spry, 166 Or. App. 26 (prior case upholding refusal to appoint substitute counsel in serial-replacement context)
- State v. Hussin, 90 Or. App. 359 (prior case upholding requiring defendant to proceed pro se after repeated requests for substitution)
- State v. Phillips, 235 Or. App. 646 (harmless-error principle for proceeding without counsel)
- State v. Mendonca, 134 Or. App. 290 (prior convictions alone insufficient to impute knowledge and waiver)
- United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir.) (once warned, further dilatory tactics may be treated as implied waiver)
