State v. Guein, 444 P.3d 340

At ~1:30 a.m. two Lenexa officers approached two cars in a closed Burger King lot; officer Weber smelled a strong odor of marijuana from one vehicle.
Weber ordered occupants out, patted down and searched both men; both had pocket contents removed and placed on a car; Larson guarded the non-searched occupant during each search.
While Guein was restrained (hands on head) during the pat-down he initially denied having weed, then said he had a “little bag”; officer retrieved it and handcuffed Guein.
While handcuffed and being walked to the patrol car, Weber twice warned Guein “Don’t fuck around with me and I ain’t gonna fuck around with you,” then left Guein in the patrol car briefly and later rapidly read Miranda warnings.
After Miranda, Guein waived and admitted he intended to sell marijuana; officers then searched his car and found additional contraband.
District court admitted the pre-Miranda statement about marijuana on his person and the post-Miranda admissions; Court of Appeals reversed suppression of post-Miranda statements (majority) and affirmed admission of the physical evidence; Kansas Supreme Court reviewed both suppression issues.

Issue	Guein's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether pre-Miranda statements (admission of marijuana on person) were admissible because statements were made during noncustodial investigatory detention	Guein: the encounter was custodial for Miranda purposes so pre-Miranda incriminating statements should be suppressed	State: the encounter was an investigatory detention (Terry-like), not custodial, so Miranda was not required	Court: Custodial — nearly all custody factors favor Guein; pre-Miranda admission suppressed
Whether post-Miranda statements (admission to intent to sell) were voluntary	Guein: Weber’s pre-Miranda threats/coercive language rendered the later waiver and confession involuntary	State: Weber’s profane admonitions were not coercive; the waiver and subsequent statements were voluntary	Court: Involuntary — pre-Miranda threats implied force; post-Miranda statements suppressed

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishes Miranda warnings requirement for custodial interrogation)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (distinguishes custodial Miranda custody from ordinary traffic stops)
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (custody inquiry asks whether a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (coercion need not be physical; credible threat can render confession involuntary)
State v. Lewis, 299 Kan. 828 (lists eight nonexclusive factors for custodial vs. investigatory interrogation)
State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989 (Miranda custody test and totality-of-circumstances approach)
State v. Schultz, 289 Kan. 334 (statements from custodial interrogation inadmissible without Miranda)
State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18 (voluntariness inquiry and effect of threats on right to remain silent)
State v. McCarther, 197 Kan. 279 (confession involuntary where threats/force were applied)