State v. Grunwald, 424 P.3d 990

Background

In Jan 2014, 16‑year‑old Meagan Grunwald drove with Jose Garcia, who announced a warrant and later shot Sgt. Cory Wride through the truck’s rear window; Wride died.
A multi‑jurisdictional pursuit followed: Garcia fired at Deputy Greg Sherwood (who survived), Trooper Jeff Blankenagel, and a semi‑tractor; the pair abandoned the truck, carjacked a vehicle, and Garcia was later shot and killed by police. Grunwald was arrested and asserted compulsion.
The State charged Grunwald as an accomplice on multiple counts (aggravated murder; attempted aggravated murder; various felony firearm and criminal mischief counts; aggravated robbery/carjacking); she was convicted on 11 of 12 counts and sentenced to consecutive terms for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery.
At trial the jury was instructed using a model accomplice‑liability instruction that: (1) allowed conviction on a reckless mens rea for the result element; (2) replaced statutory “to” (i.e., ‘‘aid to engage in’’) with “who,” eliminating the express requirement that the aid be directed to accomplishing the crime; and (3) defined “knowing” in terms of the principal’s conduct rather than the accomplice’s.
On appeal Grunwald argued ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous accomplice instructions. The court found counsel’s performance deficient and analyzed prejudice count‑by‑count.

Issues

Issue	Grunwald’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to erroneous accomplice instructions	Counsel’s failure to object to instructions that reduced the State’s burden violated Strickland	No prejudice: errors didn’t affect compulsion defense or outcome; facts overwhelmingly show concerted action	Counsel’s performance was deficient; errors existed in the instructions (reversed mens rea, wrong statutory phrasing, improper focus on principal’s conduct).
Whether the reckless‑result instruction and other errors prejudiced guilt on aggravated murder (Count One)	There was a reasonable probability a correct instruction would have led to acquittal	Evidence overwhelmingly showed intentional aiding in the murder; no prejudice	No reasonable probability of different result; conviction on Count One affirmed.
Whether the erroneous instructions prejudiced the aggravated robbery/carjacking conviction (Count Eleven)	Correct instructions might have produced reasonable doubt	Evidence showed Grunwald intentionally aided the carjacking; no prejudice	No reasonable probability of different result; conviction on Count Eleven affirmed.
Whether the erroneous instructions prejudiced the remaining accomplice firearm and attempted murder counts (Counts Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven)	The instructions could have allowed conviction without proof she intended or knew her aid would cause those specific crimes	State points to concerted course of conduct; argues lack of prejudice	There is a reasonable probability the verdicts were affected; convictions on Counts Two, Three, Five, Six, and Seven vacated and remanded for retrial.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance requires showing deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49 (accomplice must have mens rea as to the results of his/her own conduct; intentional aiding must be directed to committing the offense)
State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86 (accomplice liability requires the accused act with the mens rea to commit the principal offense)
State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75 (accomplice must intend both the underlying offense and to aid the principal)
State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355 (standard for prejudice under Strickland)
State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22 (no reasonable strategy justifies understating mens rea requirement)
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76 (adoption of Strickland two‑prong test under Utah law)