State v. Groves, 2021 NMSC 003

Background

Defendants Groves and Garcia stole a van, led police on a high-speed pursuit through neighborhoods, and collided with another car; two occupants of that car died and a third was injured.
After the collision, Defendants fled on foot, stole a second vehicle, were later arrested, and were charged with two counts each of first‑degree murder (felony murder) and aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer (§ 30-22-1.1).
The State proffered aggravated fleeing (a fourth‑degree felony) as the predicate felony for felony murder; Defendants moved to dismiss the felony‑murder counts arguing aggravated fleeing is not a collateral predicate felony under Marquez.
The district court granted dismissal, reasoning the felonious purpose of aggravated fleeing (endangering the public) was the same as the purpose of homicide, so it could not be a predicate felony.
The Supreme Court reversed: it held aggravated fleeing has an independent felonious purpose (to avoid apprehension) and therefore may serve as a predicate felony, but only if the State proves the requisite mens rea (that the defendants knew their acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether aggravated fleeing can satisfy the collateral‑felony rule as a predicate to felony murder	Aggravated fleeing has a felonious purpose independent of homicide (to avoid apprehension) and thus is collateral	Aggravated fleeing’s objective (driving in a manner that endangers life) shows the same felonious purpose as homicide, so it is not collateral	Aggravated fleeing has an independent felonious purpose and may be a predicate felony under the felonious‑purpose test
Whether causation requirement is met here	The felony (aggravated fleeing) directly caused the crash and deaths	(Implicit) Any causal link is disputed or insufficient	Causation satisfied: Defendants’ aggravated fleeing initiated and led to the fatal crash without an intervening force
Whether aggravated fleeing satisfies the inherently/foreseeably dangerous (mens rea) requirement for felony murder	The State can prove the defendants acted with at least the mens rea of second‑degree murder (knew acts created a strong probability of death) during the fleeing	Defendants contend deaths were accidental and do not show the requisite mens rea	Court: mens rea is fact‑specific; aggravated fleeing may serve as predicate only if a jury could find the defendant knew their acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
Proper test to determine collateral felony — strict elements vs felonious‑purpose	The felonious‑purpose test (from Marquez) properly captures legislative intent and prevents elevating most second‑degree murders	(District court had applied an injurious‑intent reading of the statute)	Court reiterates felonious‑purpose test: examine the abstract objective of the felony statute, not the legislature’s general safety concern or the particular defendant’s intent

Key Cases Cited

State v. Marquez, 376 P.3d 815 (2016) (adopts and applies the felonious‑purpose test to determine whether a felony is collateral to homicide)
State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977) (sets three requirements for predicate felonies: causation, collateralness, and inherent/foreseeable danger)
State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (1996) (explains policy of felony‑murder rule and collateral‑felony limitation to preserve mens rea gradations)
State v. Duffy, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807 (1998) (discusses legislature’s intent and earlier use of the strict elements test)
State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 817 P.2d 1196 (1991) (clarifies mens‑rea requirement for felony murder; requires proof defendant intended to kill or was knowingly heedless of death resulting)
State v. Padilla, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 (2008) (interprets aggravated fleeing statute’s mens rea as intent to avoid apprehension, not intent to harm)
State v. Varela, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280 (1999) (illustrates that whether a felony is a proper predicate depends on evidence of the defendant’s culpable mental state)
Campos v. Bravo, 141 N.M. 801, 161 P.3d 846 (2007) (reinforces that a predicate felony cannot be a lesser‑included offense of second‑degree murder)