State v. Gregory Hampton-Boyd, 253 A.3d 418

In the early morning of April 8, 2017, Rafael Fernandez was robbed and shot three times outside the Masheratti Lounge while a robber took his gold chain. Surveillance showed the defendant near the club that night.
Police pursuit of a fleeing sedan led officers to observe a passenger drop a gold chain and a black-and-silver firearm; the passenger later apprehended (the defendant) was missing a shoe and had been shot.
Fernandez identified the defendant in a six-photo array after viewing club video sent to him; he made an in-court identification at trial. Defense did not move to suppress the identification procedure.
Defendant was indicted on multiple charges including first-degree robbery, discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence, unlawful possession of a firearm, and assault; the State filed a habitual-offender notice on the date of the pretrial conference (more than 45 days after arraignment).
At trial the defendant requested a specific cross-racial eyewitness-identification jury instruction; the trial justice refused and instead gave a general eyewitness-identification instruction that allowed the jury to consider race among other factors but gave no further context.
Defendant was convicted and sentenced (including enhanced sentencing as a habitual offender); he appealed arguing (1) error in refusing the cross-racial instruction and (2) due-process violation from the State’s allegedly untimely habitual-offender notice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred by refusing defendant's requested cross-racial eyewitness-identification instruction	State: No specific cross-racial instruction is required; general eyewitness-identification instruction was sufficient	Hampton-Boyd: Jury should have been instructed about the cross-race effect because it can impair identification accuracy	Court: No reversible error; general instruction adequately covered law and defense could argue reliability in closing; trial justice acted within discretion
Whether filing habitual-offender notice on date of pretrial conference (beyond 45 days after arraignment) violated due process	State: § 12-19-21 permits notice within 45 days or at latest on pretrial-conference date (per precedent)	Hampton-Boyd: Notice filed after 45 days violated statute and due process; asks Court to overrule precedent	Court: Denied; adhered to State v. Peterson interpretation allowing filing up to pretrial conference; no due-process violation shown

State v. Fuentes, 162 A.3d 638 (R.I. 2017) (review of jury instructions de novo; instructions considered in whole)
State v. Davis, 131 A.3d 679 (R.I. 2016) (recommended more comprehensive eyewitness instructions as better practice)
State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093 (R.I. 2004) (trial justice discretion to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness reliability; instructions can suffice)
State v. Payette, 557 A.2d 72 (R.I. 1989) (identification instruction not mandatory; refusal not reversible if law is adequately covered)
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015) (endorsing prospective inclusion of cross-racial ID instruction)
Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873 (Mass. 2015) (prospective rule that cross-racial instruction should generally accompany model ID instruction)
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (U.S. 2012) (discussing risks of eyewitness misidentification)
State v. Peterson, 722 A.2d 259 (R.I. 1998) (statutory interpretation allowing habitual-offender notice up to pretrial conference)