State v. Gregg
474 P.3d 539
| Wash. | 2020Background
- In July 2016, then-17-year-old Sebastian Gregg and an 18-year-old companion broke into a home, shot and killed the occupant, set the house on fire, hid weapons, and later confessed; Gregg was charged in adult court with first-degree murder, first-degree burglary (both with firearm enhancements), and first-degree arson.
- Gregg pleaded guilty; the plea form’s paragraph about a 4-year firearm registration requirement had been crossed out and the court mistakenly confirmed Gregg understood the crossed-out language did not apply, but the court later ordered firearm registration under RCW 9.41.330(3).
- At a six-day sentencing hearing Gregg presented extensive mitigation evidence based on his youth and upbringing and sought a substantial downward departure (144 months); the trial court denied departure and imposed a standard-range 37-year sentence (including 10 years of firearm enhancements).
- Gregg appealed, arguing (1) RCW 9.94A.535(1) is unconstitutional as applied because it places on juveniles the burden to prove mitigating circumstances at adult sentencing, and (2) his guilty plea was involuntary due to affirmative misinformation about firearm registration.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Washington Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Court of Appeals: it held the statutory burden allocation constitutional under article I, § 14 and held the firearm registration was a collateral consequence so the misinformation did not render the plea involuntary.
- The opinion includes a dissent (Justice González, joined by Justice Yu in part) arguing children’s diminished culpability requires a presumption favoring downward departure when juveniles are sentenced in adult court.
Issues
| Issue | Gregg’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RCW 9.94A.535(1) unconstitutionally places on juveniles the burden to prove mitigating circumstances at adult sentencing | Juveniles should not bear burden; youth’s diminished culpability requires presumption in favor of mitigation and the State should prove mitigation is not present | SRA’s allocation is constitutional; Ramos controls and federal/State precedents do not require shifting burden to State | Statute is constitutional under article I, § 14; Gregg failed to show basis to overturn SRA burden allocation (Ramos controls) |
| Whether Gregg’s guilty plea is involuntary due to affirmative misinformation about a 4‑year firearm registration requirement | Misinformation about registration is an affirmative error that rendered plea invalid and warrants withdrawal | Firearm registration is a collateral consequence (not punishment); misinformation does not automatically void plea absent manifest injustice | Registration is collateral (per Ward); the misinformation did not produce manifest injustice and plea remains voluntary |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420 (2017) (upholding SRA burden allocation re: juvenile mitigation under federal Eighth Amendment analysis)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (youth differs constitutionally; mandatory life without parole for juveniles barred)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller retroactivity and guidance on rarity of irrevocably corrupt juveniles)
- State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (2017) (trial courts must consider youth as mitigating and may depart from adult sentences)
- State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67 (2018) (Washington Constitution provides greater protection re: life without parole for juveniles)
- State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488 (1994) (sex-offender registration characterized as collateral consequence, not punitive)
- State v. Turley, 149 Wn.2d 395 (2003) (affirmative misinformation about a direct consequence can invalidate a plea)
- State v. A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d 91 (2010) (misinformation about collateral consequences may amount to manifest injustice in some contexts)
- State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582 (2006) (pleas must be knowing, voluntary, and informed regarding direct consequences)
