887 N.W.2d 726
S.D.2016Background
- On April 3, 2015, Marlin Greenwood repeatedly kicked and punched Damon Fabre at a social gathering; Fabre suffered severe facial/neck blunt-force trauma, significant swelling, risk of airway compromise, a seizure, and a four-day hospital stay.
- Greenwood was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault (SDCL 22-18-1.1(1), (4)) and three counts of simple assault; he pleaded not guilty and went to trial.
- Nurse practitioner Rebecca Nichols, who treated Fabre at Avera, testified that Fabre’s airway was compromised and that she considered his condition a "serious bodily injury," describing blunt-force trauma, swelling, and risk of death.
- The defense did not object to Nichols’s testimony at trial; after the State rested the defense moved for judgment of acquittal on lack of serious bodily injury, which the court denied.
- The jury convicted Greenwood of both aggravated assault counts; he was sentenced to 20 years and appealed, arguing admission of Nichols’s opinion on seriousness of injury was plain error and violated his rights to a jury determination of elements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred by admitting Nichols’s opinion that victim suffered a "serious bodily injury" | State: Nichols was a qualified medical witness whose specialized knowledge would help the jury assess injury severity | Greenwood: Nichols impermissibly opined on an ultimate legal element, usurping the jury’s role (like Lybarger) and violating his rights | Admission was proper; Nichols’s testimony was medical, not a legal conclusion, and did not invade the jury’s province |
| Whether failure to object at trial precludes review or permits plain error review | State: issue was not preserved but plain error review applies only in exceptional cases | Greenwood: asks for plain-error reversal because testimony affected substantial rights and jury determination of an element | Plain-error standard applied and not met; no plain error found |
| Whether expert testimony exceeded permissible scope by applying statutory definition | State: expert gave medical opinion about airway compromise and risk, not interpretation of statute | Greenwood: expert effectively applied legal definition of "serious bodily injury" | Court distinguished Lybarger; Nichols was not asked to apply statutory definition and did not opine on guilt; testimony was admissible to assist the trier of fact |
| Whether Nichols’s testimony prejudiced defendant’s right to fair trial by jury | State: testimony aided jurors’ understanding of injuries; defense had cross-examination opportunities | Greenwood: testimony infringed Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by removing element from jury | Court held no deprivation of fair trial; testimony could reasonably assist jury and did not express ultimate legal conclusion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Lybarger, 497 N.W.2d 102 (S.D. 1993) (expert may not give opinion that resolves an ultimate legal issue for the jury)
- State v. Well, 620 N.W.2d 192 (S.D. 2000) (medical testimony that strays into legal conclusions can be improper, but some overlap may be harmless absent timely objection)
- State v. Beck, 785 N.W.2d 288 (S.D. 2010) (plain-error review standards and cautionary application)