154 So. 3d 940
Ala.2014Background
- State agents executed search warrants (issued by Judge Houston L. Brown) at gaming facilities in Greene County and seized hundreds of electronic gaming machines, records, and proceeds; civil forfeiture actions were later filed by the State.
- Greenetrack, Frontier, and Nova moved under Rule 3.13, Ala. R.Crim. P., for return of seized property, arguing the machines qualified as lawful "bingo" under Amendment No. 743 to the Alabama Constitution.
- Judge Brown granted the Rule 3.13 motions, concluding the machines could be lawful electronic bingo and ordering return of seized property; those orders were appealed by the State.
- A separate petition (ex parte) arose after a Greene County district judge, Lillian Jones-Osborne, declined to issue search warrants for similar machines, citing Judge Brown’s legal reasoning; the State sought mandamus relief to compel issuance.
- This Court consolidated consideration: it vacated/dismissed the Rule 3.13 judgments for lack of jurisdiction to preempt forfeiture/enforcement and granted mandamus directing issuance of the denied warrants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper appellate vehicle / forum: appeal vs mandamus; civil or criminal jurisdiction | State: Orders returning contraband are final judgments subject to appeal to this Court (civil nature, amount > $50,000). | Movants: Relief sought under Rule 3.13/R.41(g) is criminal-procedure-based and could be addressed by mandamus or by criminal-appellate forum. | The proceedings were civil (independent Rule 3.13 actions), final judgments, and within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction; appeals (not mandamus) were the proper vehicles. |
| Availability of Rule 3.13 relief when property is alleged contraband and forfeiture pending | State: Rule 3.13 cannot be used to preempt forfeiture; when property is alleged contraband and forfeiture is pending, the court lacks jurisdiction to order return. | Movants: They are entitled to lawful-possession determination and return because the machines are lawful under Amendment 743. | Court held Rule 3.13 cannot be used to adjudicate lawfulness of alleged contraband in a way that would preempt forfeiture/prosecution; trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and orders returning property were vacated/dismissed. |
| Separation-of-powers and preemptive judicial adjudication | State: Independent Rule 3.13 adjudications deciding lawfulness of alleged contraband would improperly usurp executive enforcement discretion and thwart forfeiture/prosecution. | Movants: Judicial review via Rule 3.13 is a legitimate means to challenge seizures and prove lawful possession. | Court affirmed separation-of-powers limits: parties may not litigate the core question of illegality of property in an independent Rule 3.13 proceeding that would short-circuit enforcement. |
| Denial of search warrants by district judge relying on Judge Brown’s legal ruling | State: Affidavits and videos established probable cause that machines are not traditional bingo; judge erred by applying Judge Brown’s wrongful legal standard and refusing warrants. | Judge Jones-Osborne: Denied warrants because of Judge Brown’s prior orders interpreting Amendment 743. | Court held judge exceeded discretion by denying warrants on that erroneous legal ground; mandamus issued to compel issuance of warrants (probable cause existed). |
Key Cases Cited
- Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass'n, Inc., 960 So.2d 599 (Ala. 2006) (examined characteristics distinguishing slot machines from bingo-type devices)
- Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc. v. State, 42 So.3d 65 (Ala. 2009) (defined the traditional elements of "bingo" for local amendments)
- Ex parte State, 121 So.3d 337 (Ala. 2013) (court oversight of magistrate's warrant decisions and probable-cause standard for electronic gaming devices)
- Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So.3d 587 (Ala. 2010) (separation-of-powers limits on judicial proceedings that would preempt executive enforcement)
- Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (U.S. 1962) (when a Rule 41(e)/(g) motion is independent and civil in nature absent a pending prosecution)