State v. Greene, 2015 MT 1

Greene, a prior felony sexual assault offender, registered his address in Missoula as the Ponderosa Lodge in July 2011 but did not update it after leaving July 15, 2011; a warrant issued when officers could not locate him at that address.
Greene was arrested in September 2011 and charged with failure to give notice of change of address.
At trial defense counsel informed the venire of Greene’s right not to testify; a prospective juror (Belanger) stated he would assume silence meant guilt; counsel used a peremptory strike to remove Belanger rather than a challenge for cause.
During deliberations the jury asked whether the detective actually went to the room or only checked at the office; the court supplied a limited excerpt of the detective’s testimony (partial transcript) over Greene’s objection.
Jury convicted Greene. The court orally pronounced a sentence waiving fines/fees and imposing 100 years (60 suspended) and a Tier III sexual-offender designation; the written judgment later added $980 in fines/fees and included the sex-offender designation.

Issue	State's Argument	Greene's Argument	Held
1) Ineffective assistance for not challenging juror Belanger for cause	Counsel’s choice to use a peremptory strike was a strategic decision; no automatic prejudice	Counsel should have questioned/challenged Belanger for cause; failure was deficient and prejudicial	Dismissed without prejudice — record silent on counsel’s reasons; postconviction relief is the appropriate forum unless no plausible justification exists
2) Court giving jury a partial transcript during deliberations	Providing the specific excerpt answered a limited factual question and did not unduly emphasize testimony	Supplying the transcript unduly emphasized the detective’s testimony and risked prejudice	Affirmed — court acted within discretion under §46-16-503(2), supplied a limited excerpt, and danger of undue emphasis was outweighed by probative value
3) Legality of written sentence differing from oral pronouncement	Written judgment erroneously increased sentence and improperly included sex-offender tier; should be corrected	Oral sentence waived fines/fees and no sex-offender tier authorized for this offense	Reverse in part and remand — written judgment must be corrected to match oral sentence and sex-offender tier designation must be struck

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Herrman, 316 Mont. 198 (2003) (recognizing tactical differences between peremptory strikes and challenges for cause; appellate review limited if record silent)
State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405 (1991) (common-law restriction on returning testimonial materials to jury; court must isolate limited testimony to avoid undue emphasis)
State v. Evans, 261 Mont. 508 (1993) (statutory authority to furnish jury information does not displace common-law rule; weigh probative value against undue emphasis)
State v. Kougl, 323 Mont. 6 (2004) (postconviction proceedings appropriate to develop record for ineffective assistance claims)
State v. Holt, 359 Mont. 308 (2011) (oral pronouncement controls and offenses not listed as sexual offenses cannot carry sex-offender tier designations)