State v. Greene
299 Kan. 1087
| Kan. | 2014Background
- Defendant Andrew Greene was convicted by a jury of rape for sexual intercourse with A.F., a woman with autism and intellectual disability; the district court sentenced him to life without parole after finding him an aggravated habitual sex offender.
- A.F. testified about the encounter; expert testimony established she had significant cognitive and sexual-understanding deficits; two jailhouse inmates testified Greene made inculpatory statements to them.
- Greene filed a pretrial written alibi notice naming a witness (Tamara Hutchinson) but did not present an alibi at trial; his defense instead focused on consent and whether A.F. could validly consent.
- At trial the prosecutor elicited testimony that Greene had filed the alibi notice and read the notice into the record over Greene’s objection; jail calls showing evolving defenses were also introduced.
- Greene appealed, arguing (1) the district court erred by admitting statements from his alibi notice and related evidence, and (2) his sentence should be under the more lenient persistent-sex-offender statute rather than the aggravated-habitual-sex-offender statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of alibi notice and related statements | Admission was proper to show Greene's changing defenses and statements to police/jail calls | Admission of withdrawn/abandoned alibi notice impermissibly commented on defendant's failure to present evidence and shifted burden | Court held that when a defendant abandons an alibi, evidence of the alibi notice or statements therein is inadmissible; admission here was error but harmless |
| Harmless-error standard | State argued any error was harmless given other strong evidence | Greene argued admission prejudiced him and warranted reversal | Court applied constitutional harmless-error standard and found no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict; conviction affirmed |
| Sentencing statute: aggravated habitual vs. persistent sex offender | State argued aggravated-habitual classification applied to Greene’s priors | Greene argued Turner requires sentencing under the more lenient persistent-sex-offender statute when at least one prior rape exists | Court followed Turner and held Greene must be sentenced under the more lenient K.S.A. 21-4704(j); sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing |
| Reliance on comparative statutory specificity & lenity | State urged application of aggravated-habitual statute given multiple prior sexual convictions | Greene urged that both statutes apply equally and the more lenient statute governs | Court applied Turner: when both statutes equally apply, the more lenient statute controls |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Turner, 293 Kan. 1085, 272 P.3d 19 (2012) (when both statutes apply equally, sentence under more lenient statute)
- State v. Shadden, 290 Kan. 803, 235 P.3d 436 (2010) (multistep evidentiary analysis for admissibility/relevance)
- Simms v. State, 194 Md. App. 285, 4 A.3d 72 (2010) (admitting withdrawn alibi notice improperly allows jury to infer guilt from defendant’s nonproduction)
- People v. Shannon, 88 Mich. App. 138, 276 N.W.2d 546 (1979) (explaining prejudice from informing jury of a withdrawn or unsupported alibi)