State v. Green
34,148
| N.M. Ct. App. | Jun 30, 2017Background
- Zachary Green was arrested Sept. 11, 2012 and charged with multiple felonies (armed robbery with firearm enhancement, escape, felon-in-possession, drug distribution and conspiracy). He remained in custody for much of the pretrial period.
- Defense demanded a speedy trial in magistrate court on Oct. 10, 2012; the case was bound over and an information filed Oct. 15, 2012. An initial district court trial date (May 13, 2013) was vacated after a peremptory excusal and reassignment in Dec. 2012.
- Little or no case activity occurred for over a year; Green filed a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial on Dec. 11, 2013 (15 months after arrest) and renewed multiple motions in 2014.
- The district court (on reassignment to a third judge) effectively denied Green’s speedy-trial motions; Green sought interlocutory review and appealed that denial.
- The Court of Appeals applied the Barker v. Wingo four-factor balancing test (length of delay; reason for delay; assertion of right; prejudice) and found a 23-month delay in an intermediate-complexity case triggered the speedy-trial inquiry and ultimately violated Green’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Green's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 23-month pretrial delay violated the right to a speedy trial | Delay included neutral or only slightly culpable administrative periods; parts of delay were defendant-caused when he declined offered settings; overall factors did not require dismissal | Delay far exceeded the 15-month benchmark for intermediate cases; delay was primarily administrative/negligent on the court/prosecution side; Green repeatedly asserted his right and suffered prejudice | Court: Delay (23 months) crossed presumptive-prejudice threshold; Barker factors overall favor Green; speedy-trial right violated — dismissal ordered on remand |
| Weight to assign reasons for delay (deliberate vs. negligent/administrative) | Many periods were routine or neutral; some administrative delay but not deliberate; some delay attributable to defendant’s choices | Delay was largely due to administrative failures (judge docketing, reassignment) and prosecutorial lack of diligence in securing settings or transport | Court: Delay was primarily negligent/administrative and therefore weighed against the State (but not as heavily as deliberate delay) |
| Whether Green sufficiently asserted his speedy-trial right | Early pro forma demand and later motions occurred after threshold; rejecting an offered setting reduces his weight | Green made five written demands and multiple motions; did not acquiesce and persistently sought relief | Court: Assertion factor weighed moderately–heavily in Green’s favor given repeated demands and finding he did not contribute to delay |
| Whether Green suffered actual prejudice from the delay | State questioned particulars (e.g., alleged confession/video evidence, Alaska custody/convictions, timing of bond reduction requests) and contested some claimed harms | Green submitted sworn affidavits: ~23 months incarceration, familial and economic harm, lost employment opportunities, anxiety/medical treatment, and impairment to defense (memory/witness loss) | Court: Affidavits went largely unchallenged in district court; prejudice established (oppressive incarceration, anxiety, defensive impairment); this factor weighed for Green |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (establishes four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- State v. Garza, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (2009) (New Mexico adopts Barker framework and discusses nature of prejudice)
- State v. Spearman, 283 P.3d 272 (2012) (explains deference to district court factual findings and de novo review of Barker balancing)
- State v. Montoya, 150 N.M. 415, 259 P.3d 820 (2011) (distinguishes deliberate, negligent/administrative, and valid reasons for delay)
- State v. Moreno, 148 N.M. 253, 233 P.3d 782 (2010) (treatment of pro forma demands and effect on assertion factor)
- State v. Ochoa, 327 P.3d 1102 (2014) (recognizes prolonged pretrial incarceration as evidence of prejudice)
