342 Conn. 657
Conn.2022Background:
- Defendant Damarquis Gray was convicted by a jury of felony murder and related charges for a 2014 shooting; he appealed following a guilty verdict and sentence.
- Three eyewitnesses (Wright, Gomez, Hall) were difficult to serve/subpoena and were detained via material witness warrants or capias to secure their trial attendance; each expressed reluctance and claimed memory failures at trial.
- The prosecutor reenacted portions of Wright’s and Lawrence’s grand jury testimony (court clerk read answers); transcripts of those grand jury statements were later admitted as full exhibits.
- Defense counsel never objected to the witnesses’ detentions at trial and only objected to certain uses of grand jury testimony (arguing some portions were cumulative); on appeal Gray challenged (1) detention as coercive (due process) and (2) admission of both consistent and inconsistent grand jury statements under State v. Whelan.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court held the due process claim failed under Golding (no evidence detention coerced the substance of testimony) and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the Whelan rulings (some preservation issues noted).
Issues:
| Issue | State's Argument | Gray's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether detention of material witnesses (warrants/capias) coerced testimony and violated Gray's due process rights | Detention lawfully compelled appearance only; record shows no coercion of substance; cross-examination permitted; claim unpreserved so must satisfy Golding; no constitutional violation shown | Detention (overnight confinement, references to child welfare, delays) had coercive effect that rendered witnesses’ testimony involuntary in the State’s favor | Denied under Golding prong three: attendance was compelled but no evidence detention affected substance/voluntariness of testimony; court stressed least restrictive means and recommended protective practices |
| Whether prior inconsistent grand jury statements were admissible substantively under Whelan (preservation) | Whelan permits substantive use of prior inconsistent statements; defense mostly objected on cumulative grounds, not reliability; some objections waived | Grand jury statements were unreliable and should be limited to impeachment; admission for truth was improper (raised on appeal) | Claim unpreserved on reliability ground—defense did not object on that basis at trial; appellate review declined |
| Whether admission of consistent portions of grand jury testimony and admission of grand jury transcripts after reenactment was an abuse of discretion | Trial court properly admitted consistent portions to avoid jury confusion and to provide context for inconsistent statements; transcripts were rightly admitted as exhibits despite reenactment | Consistent portions should have been redacted under Whelan; admitting transcripts after reenactment was cumulative and prejudicial | No abuse of discretion: consistent passages were necessary for context and to prevent confusion; transcripts were admissible and not unduly cumulative because witnesses did not admit the substance and jury could request playback |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 (Conn. 1986) (hearsay exception permitting substantive use of prior inconsistent statements)
- State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (Conn. 1989) (framework for appellate review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
- In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 (Conn. 2015) (modification/clarification of Golding third prong)
- United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2013) (distinguishes lawful compulsion to appear from coercion of testimony; no due process violation where attendance compelled but testimony not shown coerced)
- Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 2000) (detention and statements by court/prosecutor can be coercive and render testimony involuntary in extreme circumstances)
- State v. Correia, 33 Conn. App. 457 (Conn. App. 1994) (discusses when documentary evidence may be cumulative)
- State v. Osborne, 162 Conn. App. 364 (Conn. App. 2016) (trial court may admit other parts of a statement to provide context and avoid jury confusion)