State v. Gray, 402 P.3d 254

In 2013, 17-year-old Eric D. Gray sent an unsolicited photo of his erect penis to a 22-year-old woman; law enforcement linked the messages to Gray and he admitted sending them.
Gray was charged in juvenile court with second-degree dealing in depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct (RCW 9.68A.050) and telephone harassment; he was convicted on the dealing charge in a stipulated facts trial, sentenced to confinement, community service, fees, and required to register as a sex offender.
The Court of Appeals (Div. III) affirmed, reasoning the statute can cover self-produced images by minors and is constitutional.
The Washington Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the statute applies when the depicted minor is the disseminating person and whether the statute is overbroad or void for vagueness under federal and state constitutional protections.
The majority held the statute’s plain language (defining “person” to include natural persons and “minor” as under 18) encompasses a minor who develops and disseminates sexually explicit images of themself, and that the statute is neither overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague.
Justice McCloud dissented, arguing longstanding interpretive principles and precedent (e.g., Gebardi) presume a protective statute was not intended to criminalize members of the protected class for their own exploitation and that the majority’s reading yields absurd and harmful results for minors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Gray)	Held
Whether RCW 9.68A.050 permits prosecuting a minor for taking and distributing a sexually explicit photo of himself	The statute’s plain language applies to any “person” (natural person) who knowingly develops or disseminates images of a “minor”; a minor can be both the person and the depicted minor.	The statute should be read to exclude the depicted minor from the set of prosecutable “persons”; legislature intended to target adult purveyors/exploiters, not self-produced juvenile images.	Held: Plain language controls; “person” includes minors and therefore statute covers self-produced dissemination by a minor.
Whether RCW 9.68A.050 is overbroad or unconstitutionally vague (First and Due Process concerns)	The statute targets child pornography, a category outside First Amendment protection; wording gives sufficient notice and does not invite arbitrary enforcement in Gray’s case.	The statute risks criminalizing consensual teen "sexting," is overbroad under the First Amendment and vague as applied to minors.	Held: Not overbroad (targets unprotected child pornography) and not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Gray; court declined to address hypotheticals like consensual teen-to-teen exchanges.

Elgin v. State, 118 Wn.2d 551 (Wash. 1992) (statutory interpretation: give effect to legislative intent and plain language)
Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (U.S. 1932) (protective statutes construed to avoid prosecuting members of the protected class for their own exploitation)
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (U.S. 1982) (child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment)
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (U.S. 2002) (limits on banning virtual or simulated depictions that appear to be minors)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (U.S. 2008) (overbreadth analysis requires construing statute and is disfavored; child pornography may be regulated)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (vagueness doctrine and requirement of minimal guidelines for enforcement)