State v. Granados, 451 P.3d 289

Victim was followed and rammed by a maroon/red Chevy Malibu with a yellow triangular “baby-on-board” sign; after the crash the Malibu’s driver fired ~10 shots, grazing the victim’s neck. Witnesses observed a single Hispanic male driver, front-end damage, a missing headlight, and the bumper later found in the fleeing car’s back seat.
The Malibu belonged to Granados’s girlfriend; she had reported it missing and officers had identified Granados driving that Malibu the day before and within two hours after the shooting.
Officers later recovered the abandoned Malibu after a high-speed chase (reaching ~95 mph); inside were live rounds and ten spent .40-caliber casings. DNA testing (done by pooling extracts) identified Granados as the major contributor to DNA on the filtered material from the casings/rounds; a partial palm print from the bumper did not match him.
Granados was charged with attempted murder, possession of a firearm by a restricted person, criminal mischief, failure to stop, and drug offenses; a jury convicted him on all counts.
At trial the district court dismissed (and replaced with an alternate) Juror 16 after observing repeated episodes of her falling asleep over two days; defense objected and requested questioning, which the court denied.
Granados appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence that he was the shooter and (2) the court violated Utah R. Crim. P. 17(g) by dismissing a sleeping juror without first questioning her.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to identify shooter	State: cumulative circumstantial evidence (vehicle match, eyewitness descriptions, DNA on casings, officer IDs, and flight) supports identity beyond a reasonable doubt.	Granados: evidence only raises speculative inferences; DNA could be from live rounds or transfer; palm print non-match; some witnesses failed to ID him.	Affirmed — the cumulative circumstantial "mosaic" was sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer Granados was the shooter.
Dismissal of sleeping juror under Rule 17(g)	State: court observed juror sleeping repeatedly and missing significant testimony; dismissal and replacement were within the court’s discretion.	Granados: court should have questioned the juror before discharging her to determine what she missed.	Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion; direct observation over two days justified dismissal without further voir dire.

State v. Ashcraft, 349 P.3d 664 (Utah 2015) (sufficiency review defers to jury and considers cumulative circumstantial evidence)
State v. MacNeill, 397 P.3d 626 (Utah Ct. App. 2017) (affirming inference-of-guilt standards for circumstantial evidence ‘‘mosaic’’)
State v. Montoya, 84 P.3d 1183 (Utah 2004) (standards for reviewing directed-verdict/sufficiency claims)
State v. Marquina, 437 P.3d 628 (Utah Ct. App. 2018) (discussing discretion courts have in handling sleeping jurors)
United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2000) (sleeping juror removal appropriate when juror cannot perform duties)
United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1972) (juror unable to remain awake may be removed)
State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987) (evidence of flight is probative of consciousness of guilt)
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) (trial judge best positioned to assess juror incapacity)
State v. Mellor, 272 P. 635 (Utah 1928) (recognition of trial court discretion concerning juror fitness)