State v. Graham S.
149 Conn. App. 334
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- Defendant Graham S. entered the victim’s apartment after a dispute, forcibly broke into the victim’s bedroom, said “I’m not going back to jail,” and choked her until she lost consciousness; their young daughter was present. Victim later sought medical care and police arrested defendant.
- Defendant was tried by jury and convicted of burglary in the first degree, strangulation in the second degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, assault in the third degree, and risk of injury to a child. Sentenced to an effective 20-year term (suspended after 9 years) and probation.
- Pretrial the court limited testimony about uncharged misconduct and prior convictions but allowed the victim to testify about what she saw/heard that day. During trial the victim testified the defendant said he was “not going back to jail” immediately before the attack; defense objected and court overruled.
- On appeal defendant challenged (1) admission of the jail-reference statement and failure to declare a mistrial; (2) multiple convictions (strangulation, unlawful restraint, assault) arising from the same incident in light of § 53a-64bb(b); and (3) jury unanimity instructions given alternative theories of each charged offense.
- Court of Appeals: affirmed admission of the statement and no sua sponte mistrial; agreed with parties that § 53a-64bb(b) precludes convicting defendant of strangulation and assault/unlawful restraint for the same incident and reversed the latter two convictions; rejected defendant’s unanimity instruction claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of victim’s testimony that defendant said “I’m not going back to jail” before attack | Statement was admissible as part of victim’s description of events and relevant to motive (to prevent calling police) | Statement was prejudicial, contradicted pretrial ruling limiting reference to prior convictions/uncharged misconduct; law-of-the-case breach; mistrial required | Admissible: consistent with pretrial ruling permitting witnesses to describe what they saw/heard; court did not abuse discretion; no mistrial required |
| Multiple convictions from same incident under § 53a-64bb(b) (strangulation + assault + unlawful restraint) | State conceded only strangulation should remain where all three derive from same act; allowed prosecution but not multiple convictions | Defendant argued statutory text unclear which convictions must fall; sought reversal or new trial/sentencing | Statute forbids convictions for strangulation and assault or unlawful restraint arising from same incident; court reversed assault and unlawful restraint convictions and vacated their sentences; strangulation (and burglary, risk of injury) remain |
| Remedy after reversing convictions | Vacate the invalid convictions and sentences; no retrial or resentencing needed because sentencing intent was clear | Requested new trial or resentencing | No new trial or resentencing; trial court intended burglary sentence to control, so vacating the two convictions/sentences suffices |
| Jury unanimity instruction given alternative theories | Jury instructions and multiple specific unanimity prompts were adequate; no sanctioning of nonunanimous verdict | Court failed to require juror unanimity as to which alternative act supported convictions (entry vs. remaining; impede breathing vs. restrict circulation; cause vs. permit child endangerment) | No error: instructions repeatedly required unanimity and did not sanction nonunanimous verdict; Famiglietti test not triggered |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (constitutional-avoidance principle)
- United States v. Fisk, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 445 (1865) (statutory construction: interpreting and/and/or language)
- State v. Famiglietti, 219 Conn. 605 (1991) (multipartite test for specific-unanimity jury instructions)
- State v. Dieudonne, 109 Conn. App. 375 (2008) (vacating affected convictions need not trigger resentencing when court’s sentencing intent is clear)
- State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242 (2013) (treatment of greater and lesser included offenses on conviction reversal)
- Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996) (federal guidance referenced regarding vacatur vs. merger of convictions)