337 P.3d 319
Wash.2014Background
- Graham’s methamphetamine–induced shooting spree in January 2002 included firing at six police officers with an AK-47; he was convicted in 2003 of 10 offenses, including six serious violent offenses for SRA purposes.
- Graham received an aggregate sentence of 1,225.5 months due to an enhanced offender score and consecutive sentences under RCW 9.94A.589(l)(b), plus firearm enhancements.
- At resentencing Graham sought an exceptional downward sentence of 25 years, arguing RCW 9.94A.535(l)(g) allows departure from the standard range for the multiple offense policy.
- The trial judge previously expressed that there was no authority to impose an exceptional sentence and sentenced Graham at the low end of the standard range for each serious violent offense, running consecutively.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court granted review to decide whether .535(l)(g) permits an exceptional sentence for multiple serious violent offenses scored under .589(l)(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does RCW 9.94A.535(l)(g) permit an exceptional sentence when the multiple offense policy under RCW 9.94A.589 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive? | State argues .535(l)(g) does not differentiate and may apply to all subsections of .589. | Graham contends .535(l)(g) should not apply to serious violent offenses under .589(l)(b). | Yes; .535(l)(g) can apply to .589(l)(b) to impose an exceptional sentence downward. |
| Whether Mulholland governs and supports applying .535(l)(g) to multiple serious violent offenses under .589(l)(b). | State relies on Mulholland to permit exceptional sentences under .535(l)(g). | Graham argues Mulholland should not extend to .589(l)(b). | Mulholland controls; exceptional sentences may be imposed for offenses scored under .589(l)(b). |
| Whether the statute allows downward departures by departing downward from standard ranges and/or by running sentences concurrently to remedy a clearly excessive presumptive sentence. | Statutory text contemplates departures to correct excesses. | Graham asserts the legislature did not intend downward departures for these offenses. | Yes; downward departures may be accomplished by lowering offense ranges and/or by concurrent sentencing. |
| What factual finding is required to invoke .535(l)(g)? | Statute unclear about the requisite finding beyond “clearly excessive.” | Statute clearly directs consideration of proportionality to SRA aims. | Statute is clear; no additional factual tightening is required beyond assessing excessiveness against SRA goals. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Personal Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322 (2007) (set precedent that .535(l)(g) may apply to .589(l)(a) and (b) to allow concurrent or varied departures)
- State v. Batista, 116 Wn.2d 777 (1991) (recognized parallel form of former .94A.390(2)(f) for upward departures; influenced interpretation of .535(l)(g))
- State v. Oxborrow, 106 Wn.2d 525 (1986) (noting legislature’s safety valve rationale for departures under SRA)
- State v. Jones, 172 Wn.2d 236 (2011) (principle of de novo interpretation of SRA and plain language analysis)
- State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106 (2007) (articulates plain-language approach to interpreting SRA)