344 Conn. 825
Conn.2022Background
- Defendant James Graham, with Robert Moye and Brennan Coleman, encountered and robbed Leandre Benton; Coleman’s gun jammed and Graham fatally shot Benton. They took money, a phone, and clothing and fled.
- About one week later Moye told his friend Steven Capers in Moye’s backyard that the three planned to "stain" Benton and that Graham fired the fatal shot; Graham separately told friends he shot the victim. Capers and another friend (Bacote) testified at trial pursuant to cooperation agreements about those statements.
- The trial court found Moye unavailable and admitted Capers’ testimony under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6(4) (statement against penal interest), finding the statement trustworthy (timing, close relationship, casual setting, corroboration by surveillance and ballistics).
- Graham testified and denied involvement; prosecutor argued during closing that Graham tailored his testimony after hearing other witnesses and pointed to surveillance, GPS, witness testimony, and ballistics.
- Jury convicted Graham of felony murder, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit; he appealed raising (1) evidentiary and Sixth Amendment confrontation objections to admission of Moye’s statements, (2) challenge to prosecutor’s tailoring argument under the Connecticut constitution, and (3) claim of prosecutorial impropriety regarding cooperation agreements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Moye’s out-of-court statement under Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6(4) (dual inculpatory) | Statement was against Moye’s penal interest and trustworthy (made within a week to a close friend, corroborated by video and ballistics). | Statement was self-serving/minimizing and portions that named Graham were non-self-inculpatory and untrustworthy. | Admitted: court did not abuse discretion — whole statement was objectively against Moye’s penal interest and trustworthy under the § 8-6(4) factors. |
| Sixth Amendment confrontation (testimonial character of Moye’s statement) | Nontestimonial: informal, volunteered to a friend before charges; admissible under evidence rules. | Admission violated Crawford/Davis because defendant couldn’t cross-examine declarant. | Rejected: statement was nontestimonial under the primary-purpose test; no Confrontation Clause violation. |
| Prosecutor’s closing ‘‘tailoring’’ argument (state constitutional confrontation claim) | Argument was specific: tied to surveillance, GPS, witnesses and inconsistencies, so permissible. | Prosecutor made a generic tailoring attack (impermissible) that violated article first, § 8. | Rejected: comments were specific (evidence-based) not generic; no state constitutional violation. |
| Alleged impropriety eliciting cooperation-agreement content and arguing it | Questions and argument related to testimony the court admitted; prosecutor may comment on admitted evidence. | Improper elicitation and use of cooperation agreement material in closing. | Not reviewed on merits: claim was an unpreserved evidentiary complaint recast as prosecutorial impropriety; appellate review declined. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351 (Conn. 2004) (analyzes statements against penal interest and admissibility of dual-inculpatory declarations)
- Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (U.S. 1994) (interprets federal rule on admission of statements against penal interest and non-self-inculpatory portions)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial hearsay and Confrontation Clause framework)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (U.S. 2006) (primary-purpose test for testimonial statements)
- Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (U.S. 2015) (clarifies primary-purpose inquiry for nontestimonial statements)
- State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 (Conn. 2007) (objective reasonable-person test for statements against penal interest)
- State v. Weatherspoon, 332 Conn. 531 (Conn. 2019) (distinguishes generic vs specific tailoring arguments in closing)
- Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (U.S. 2000) (held generic tailoring argument does not violate federal confrontation rights)