State v. Goynes, 293 Neb. 288

Defendant Daunte L. Goynes (17 at the time of the offense) was convicted of second-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon; sentence: 60 years to life (murder) plus 10–20 years (weapon), consecutive.
Direct appeal affirmed. Goynes filed a first postconviction motion within 1 year after Miller v. Alabama but did not assert a Miller-based claim; that motion was denied.
Goynes filed a second postconviction motion (Feb. 5, 2015) asserting an Eighth Amendment/Miller claim: his aggregate term-of-years sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole and therefore unconstitutional without individualized juvenile sentencing consideration.
District court denied the second motion without an evidentiary hearing, holding it time-barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(4)(e)/(d) and alternatively as successive.
Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: held the one-year limitations period in § 29-3001(4)(d) runs from the date the constitutional claim was initially recognized (Miller), not from a later state retroactivity decision (Mantich); because Goynes did not raise Miller in his first postconviction motion filed within one year of Miller, his second motion was untimely.

Issue	Goynes' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether second postconviction motion asserting Miller claim was timely under § 29-3001(4)(d)	Motion filed within 1 year of Mantich (state retroactivity decision), so timely	Limitations period began one year after Miller (initial recognition), so Goynes’ Feb. 2015 filing is untimely	Motion untimely under § 29-3001(4)(d); must run from Miller date
Whether Miller-based claim may be asserted against lengthy term-of-years sentence (functional equivalent of LWOP)	Miller principles should apply to lengthy juvenile term-of-years sentences that are effectively life	Miller addresses mandatory life without parole; Goynes received a parole-eligible term — Miller inapplicable as written	Court did not decide the substantive reach of Miller; resolution unnecessary because of timeliness ruling
Whether an evidentiary hearing was required on Goynes’ second motion	Hearing required because allegations, if proven, would infringe Eighth Amendment rights	Motion was time-barred and thus no hearing required	No hearing required because claim was untimely under postconviction statute

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders unconstitutional without individualized sentencing)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. _ (2016) (new substantive rules must be given retroactive effect in state collateral review when they determine case outcome)
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005) (1-year limitation in federal collateral statute runs from initial recognition date of the right)
State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 (2014) (Nebraska held Miller retroactive on collateral review)
State v. Goynes, 278 Neb. 230 (2009) (direct-appeal opinion affirming convictions)
State v. Smith, 288 Neb. 797 (2014) (discussion on limits of postconviction remedies and potential habeas avenues)