State v. Gouveia.
139 Haw. 70
Haw.2016Background
- Defendant Royce Gouveia was charged with manslaughter after an altercation that left the victim brain dead. Trial proceeded to closing arguments and jury deliberations.
- The jury sent two notes to the court: one stating they had reached a verdict, another (four minutes later) expressing concern that a man in the gallery on the prosecutor’s side had been "glaring and whistling" at Gouveia and that jurors feared for their safety.
- The court, with agreement of counsel, individually voir dired the twelve jurors about the incident; several jurors said they saw the conduct, some said it was discussed early in deliberations, and all stated it did not affect their own votes (one said it appeared to affect others).
- The State moved for a mistrial; the circuit court found juror statements not fully credible, concluded the presumption of prejudice was not rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt, declared a mistrial for manifest necessity, and sealed but did not read the verdict.
- Gouveia moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds; the circuit court denied the motion. The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed. The Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Gouveia) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether manifest necessity existed to declare a mistrial after jurors reported safety concerns | The outside incident and its discussion during deliberations raised a rebuttable presumption of prejudice that was not shown harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; given timing and juror statements suggesting influence, only a mistrial would cure taint | Each juror said the incident did not affect their vote; jurors’ safety concerns were peripheral and did not taint the verdict, so mistrial was not manifestly necessary | Court held trial court did not abuse discretion: presumption of prejudice was not overcome beyond a reasonable doubt and no reasonable lesser remedy would cure it (mistrial proper) |
| Whether juror testimony about the incident violated HRE Rule 606(b) | The court properly limited inquiry to what occurred and when; the trial court relied on permissible facts (timing, discussion, fear) rather than jurors’ mental processes | Juror testimony about effect on verdict was barred by Rule 606(b) and inadmissible; reliance on it contaminated the mistrial decision | Court concluded the court’s factual inquiry fell within Rule 606(b) limits (it did not rely on jurors’ internal thought processes) and therefore rejected the Rule 606(b) challenge on the merits |
| Whether retrial is barred by double jeopardy after the mistrial | Retrial is allowed when mistrial is supported by manifest necessity | Retrial barred because mistrial was improper | Because mistrial was supported by manifest necessity, retrial is not barred; motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds properly denied |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Wilmer, [citation="97 Hawai'i 238, 36 P.3d 756"] (trial judge has broad discretion to declare mistrial; manifest necessity standard and need for reasons on record)
- State v. Quitog, [citation="85 Hawai'i 128, 938 P.2d 559"] (defendant’s right to be tried by single tribunal may yield to public interest in fair retrial; definition of manifest necessity)
- State v. Napulou, [citation="85 Hawai'i 49, 936 P.2d 1297"] (jurors’ safety concerns not necessarily per se grounds for mistrial; voir dire may show harmlessness)
- State v. Bailey, [citation="126 Hawai'i 383, 271 P.3d 1142"] (distinguishes inquiry into pre- and post-verdict statements; limits on juror testimony under Rule 606(b))
- State v. Kim, [citation="103 Hawai'i 286, 81 P.3d 1200"] (court may consider whether an outside statement was made and whether, given it, trial was impartial; limits juror testimony post-verdict)
- State v. Deguair, [citation="136 Hawai'i 71, 358 P.3d 43"] (manifest necessity protects right to fair trial for both parties)
- State v. Minn, [citation="79 Hawai'i 461, 903 P.2d 1282"] (trial court must consider less severe alternatives before declaring mistrial)
- State v. Williamson, 72 Haw. 97, 807 P.2d 593 (two-step inquiry: whether outside influence could be substantially prejudicial and, if so, whether influence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)