State v. Gordon, 359 P.3d 499

At ~1:00 a.m., Officer Crino observed defendant turn from Beaverton‑Hillsdale Highway onto 107th Ave., drive ~3 blocks, reverse direction, then rejoin the highway; Crino stopped the vehicle and began a DUII investigation. Defendant and his wife were in the car.
Defendant was charged with DUII and refusal to test; he moved to suppress evidence obtained after the traffic stop.
Crino testified he saw an illegal U‑turn in the roadway and frequently enforces U‑turn violations at that intersection; defendant and his wife testified he turned around in a restaurant driveway.
The trial court found all witnesses generally truthful, concluded the turn occurred at the driveway (so no ORS 811.365 violation occurred), and granted suppression.
The state appealed, arguing the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring the traffic violation actually to have occurred rather than asking whether the officer reasonably believed a violation occurred at the time of the stop.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the stop lawful based on probable cause?	Officer’s testimony was credible; even if mistaken, his belief that an illegal U‑turn occurred could provide probable cause.	Suppression: no probable cause because, as found by the court, no illegal U‑turn actually occurred.	Trial court applied wrong legal test; vacated and remanded to assess whether officer subjectively believed and whether that belief was objectively reasonable.
Proper legal standard for traffic stops	Stop lawful if officer subjectively believed a violation occurred and that belief was objectively reasonable.	Court below treated absence of an actual violation as dispositive.	Court reaffirmed the subjective‑belief + objective‑reasonableness construct; remand for application of that test.
Effect of trial‑court credibility findings	State: court must determine what the officer perceived at the time of the stop (not only the objective fact of whether a violation occurred).	Defense: court may rely on findings that no violation actually occurred to suppress.	Because the trial court may have conflated actual occurrence with perceived facts, remand required to clarify findings under correct legal standard.

State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66 (1993) (appellate review is bound by trial court’s factual findings supported by sufficient evidence)
State v. Matthews, 320 Or. 398 (1994) (traffic stops must be supported by probable cause under OR. Const. art. I, §9)
State v. Isley, 182 Or. App. 186 (2002) (probable cause: officer’s subjective belief plus objective reasonableness)
State v. Tiffin, 202 Or. App. 199 (2005) (officer’s perceptions, even if mistaken, can establish objective probable cause)
State v. Boatright, 222 Or. App. 406 (2008) (facts as officer perceived must establish offense elements for objective component)
State v. Gilbertz, 173 Or. App. 90 (2001) (lawful stops are not invalidated simply because officer was wrong about commission of an offense)
Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485 (1968) (addresses inferences from trial court’s factual findings)
State v. Ellis, 252 Or. App. 382 (2012) (appellate court will not infer facts consistent with a trial court’s ruling if the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard)