State v. Goldberg, 483 P.3d 671

Driver of a pickup reported a hit-and-run; he collected white bumper/grill fragments from the road and observed paint transfer and scratches on his truck.
Deputy Holiman identified a likely white Chevrolet Impala as the striking vehicle, located an Impala at defendant Goldberg’s residence, and photographed visible front-end damage during an initial visit.
On a subsequent visit Holiman stood in the driveway, held a recovered bumper fragment up to Goldberg’s parked Impala (crouching beside the car), and photographed the fragment aligned with the vehicle.
Goldberg was charged under ORS 811.700 (failure to perform duties when property is damaged); she moved to suppress the comparison photograph as the product of a warrantless search; the trial court denied suppression and convicted.
The Oregon Court of Appeals (en banc) considered whether the officer’s actions—though not physically touching the car—exceeded the scope of implied consent for social visitors and thus constituted a search; it also addressed whether visible scuffs/scratches constitute “damage.”

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an officer’s act of holding a recovered fragment up to a parked car in a driveway and photographing it, without physically touching the car, is a warrantless search under Article I, §9 of the Oregon Constitution	Holiman’s presence and comparison were consistent with a social visitor approaching the house; he only observed and did not manipulate or touch the vehicle, so no search occurred	The deputy exceeded the reasonable scope of permission for social visitors by kneeling beside the car, aligning the fragment, and photographing it, converting his presence into a trespass/search	Held: Search occurred. The officer’s behavior exceeded social‑visitor norms and implied consent; suppression of the comparison photograph was required (reversed and remanded)
Whether visible scratch and scuff marks satisfy “damage” under ORS 811.700	The statute’s purpose (insurance exchange, claims) covers even minor physical harm; scratches/scuffs can impair completeness/efficiency and thus are damage	Visible scuffs and scratches are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute the statutory element of “damage”	Held: Scratches and scuffs, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, were sufficient to deny a judgment of acquittal; “damage” includes physical harm or loss of completeness/efficiency

State v. Portrey, 134 Or App 460 (holding that picking up and examining boots on a front porch to reveal hidden information was an unconstitutional search)
State v. Ohling, 70 Or App 249 (recognizing an occupant’s implied consent to approach the front door and limiting that consent by location and expected visitor behavior)
State v. Cardell, 180 Or App 104 (concluding that tactile examination of a tire’s heat exceeded implied consent and constituted a search)
State v. Fortmeyer/Palmer, 178 Or App 485 (kneeling to peer through an obstructed basement window violated social/legal norms and was a search)
State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or 613 (establishing that the threshold question is whether police conduct is sufficiently intrusive to be a search)
State v. Jones, 298 Or App 264 (construing “damage” to include physical harm or loss of completeness, efficiency, or function)