State v. GLUSHKO, 266 P.3d 50

This case consolidates two Oregon Supreme Court review proceedings challenging speedy-trial dismissals under ORS 135.747.
ORS 135.747 requires dismissal if a defendant is not brought to trial within a reasonable time and no postponement consent by the defendant.
Defendants argued failure to appear at hearings cannot count as consent to delay; they urged delays were unreasonable.
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal rulings; this Court reviews whether failure to appear constitutes consent and whether any delay was reasonable.
Glushko engaged in diversion for DUII and later ceased participation, leading to an arrest warrant eight years later and a DUII conviction after trial.
Little failed to appear, later moved to Oregon; an arrest warrant remained outstanding until 2008 and charges were pursued, with a 2009 conditional guilty plea.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether failure to appear constitutes consent to delay	Glushko; Little: failure to appear implies consent	Glushko; Little: consent requires express agreement to postponement	No; consent requires express agreement to a postponement.
Whether delays were reasonable despite lack of consent	Delays were reasonable given defendant's fault and ongoing enforcement	Delays due to failure to appear were not reasonable without consent or good cause	Delays were reasonable under ORS 135.747.
What the historical meaning of consent in ORS 135.747 requires	Consent may be implied by conduct	Consent requires express agreement to a postponement	Consent is limited to express consent to a state- or court-requested postponement.

State v. Chadwick, 150 Or. 645, 47 P.2d 232 (1935) (1935) (consent to continuances requires express agreement)
State v. Kuhnhausen, 201 Or. 478, 272 P.2d 225 (1954) (1954) (express consent required for continuance)
State v. Adams, 339 Or. 104, 116 P.3d 898 (2005) (2005) (lack of objection does not imply consent to delay)
State v. Davids, 339 Or. 96, 116 P.3d 894 (2005) (2005) (two-step analysis for ORS 135.747: determine delay then reasonableness)
State v. Crosby, 217 Or. 393, 342 P.2d 831 (1959) (1959) (consent can relate to a defendant's explicit actions in delaying)
State v. Robinson, 217 Or. 612, 343 P.2d 886 (1959) (1959) (delay may result from a defendant's motion; express consent requirement remains)
Johnson v. State, 339 Or. 69, 116 P.3d 879 (2005) (2005) (reasonableness requires examining attendant circumstances)
State v. Jackson, 228 Or. 371, 365 P.2d 294 (1961) (1961) (delay attributed to defendant's conduct influences good cause for delay)