336 P.3d 875
Kan. Ct. App.2014Background
- Glover was charged with murder-related offenses and proceeded to a plea after extensive negotiations with the State, represented by Mank, an experienced defense attorney.
- Mank advised plea negotiations due to likely sentencing exposure; Glover initially resisted but later agreed to plead under a negotiated term of 152 months.
- On December 9, 2012, Mank reviewed the plea documents with Glover, emphasizing his voluntary choice to go to trial or plead.
- At the plea hearing, the court conducted an extensive colloquy; Glover admitted understanding rights and proceeding voluntarily, though he initially contradicted a factual detail during colloquy.
- Glover pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter, aggravated burglary, and robbery; sentencing imposed 152 months; Glover later sought to withdraw the plea, claiming coercion.
- The district court denied the motion to withdraw, finding no good cause and noting the defense had ample opportunity to raise concerns and thoroughly discussed the plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether good cause to withdraw before sentencing exists | Glover argues coercion and lack of voluntariness justify withdrawal | Glover asserts Edwards/Macias-Medina factors establish good cause | No abuse of discretion; Edgar factors support denial |
| Appropriate standard of review for pre-sentencing withdrawal | Glover requests de novo review due to due-process concerns | Court should apply abuse of discretion per Freeman | Abuse of discretion standard governs |
| Whether Edgar and Macias-Medina factors remain controlling | Glover urges adopting a broader 'good cause' test | Statutory text and precedent keep Edgar/Macias-Medina factors | Edgar and Macias-Medina factors control |
| Impact of coercion vs. self-induced pressure from criminal history | Glover was pressured by counsel due to history; coercion asserted | Pressure stemmed from history/sentencing guidelines, not coercion by counsel | Record shows pressure from history, not coercion by counsel |
| Effect of same judge presiding over plea and withdrawal hearing | Judicial familiarity undermines credibility of withdrawal claim | No explicit argument to the contrary; credibility supports denial | No abuse; judge's familiarity supported credibility assessment |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30 (2006) (Edgar factors for good cause to withdraw plea)
- State v. Macias-Medina, 293 Kan. 833 (2012) (additional factors for good cause; avoid distortion)
- State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506 (2010) (Edgar framework does not create constitutional standard)
- State v. Hill, 247 Kan. 377 (1990) (withdrawal discretion; no automatic right)
- State v. Cheeks, 298 Kan. 1 (2013) (legislative policy not altered by court)
- United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670 (1997) (necessity of care in accepting guilty pleas; not automatic withdrawal)
- Starrs v. Virginia, 287 Va. 1 (2014) (foreign authority cited on withdrawal standards)
- United States v. Muhammad, 747 F.3d 1234 (2014) (factors for fair and just reason post-plea withdrawal)