State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852

Background

Joseph A. Gill was charged in 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest based on alleged conduct from the 1990s–2006; some counts were quashed or limited on statute-of-limitations grounds.
Gill filed motions to quash (statute of limitations) and later a motion for absolute discharge asserting violations of statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights.
Trial was initially set for July 13, 2016; on June 20, 2016, Gill orally moved to continue trial because depositions were incomplete; the court granted the continuance and reset trial to September 14, 2016. Gill did not object.
The State later obtained a continuance (victim’s pregnancy) moving trial to October 12; the State amended the information in October to add habitual-criminal allegations, and trial was continued to November 16 after defense counsel requested time to review.
On November 4, 2016, Gill renewed his statute-of-limitations motion and moved for absolute discharge. The district court denied absolute discharge, concluding Gill permanently waived his statutory 6-month speedy-trial right by requesting a continuance that extended the trial past the statutory period; the court alternatively found State-attributable delay insufficient to require discharge.
Gill appealed, challenging denial of absolute discharge (statutory and constitutional speedy-trial claims) and the court’s failure to rule on his motion to quash (statute of limitations).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Gill permanently waived the statutory 6-month speedy-trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that moved trial beyond six months	State: The June 20, 2016 continuance requested by Gill extended the trial past the 6-month clock and thus effected a permanent statutory waiver	Gill: His continuance was for a definite period and did not effect an automatic/permanent waiver; broader filings should not automatically waive statutory rights	Court: Affirmed waiver — § 29-1207(4)(b) creates a permanent waiver whenever a defendant-requested continuance extends trial beyond the statutory six months; definite vs. indefinite continuances irrelevant
Whether the district court erred in denying absolute discharge on constitutional speedy-trial grounds	Gill: Even if statutory waiver occurred, his constitutional right remained and was violated	State: Constitutional protection remains but Gill failed to show violation under the balancing test	Court: No merit to constitutional claim; denial of absolute discharge affirmed
Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to address Gill’s motion to quash (statute-of-limitations claim) in this interlocutory appeal	Gill: The quash ruling (or failure to rule) should be reviewable with the absolute-discharge order	State: A motion to quash on statute-of-limitations grounds is not a final, appealable order and does not affect a substantial right here	Court: No jurisdiction to consider the statute-of-limitations assignment; ruling on absolute discharge does not make the quash issue appealable
Whether the reason or nature (definite vs. indefinite) of the continuance matters to waiver analysis	Gill: Nature/reason should matter; otherwise any filing could operate as a permanent waiver	State: Statute’s language and precedent treat all defendant-requested continuances the same for waiver purposes	Court: The reason and definite/indefinite distinction are irrelevant; waiver depends only on whether the continuance pushed trial past the six-month date

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288 (interpreting § 29-1207 waiver language)
State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (holding defendant-requested continuance that extends trial beyond six months effects permanent statutory waiver)
State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (applying Mortensen to motion-for-discharge context)
State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (discussing interplay of defense continuances and the speedy-trial clock; concurring opinion prompted statutory amendment)
State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762 (statute-of-limitations ruling is not a final, appealable order)
State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241 (recognizing absolute discharge rulings implicate substantial rights)
State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747 (standard of review for speedy-trial dismissal rulings)