State v. Gill
297 Neb. 852
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Joseph A. Gill was charged in Nov. 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child and incest arising from alleged conduct in the 1990s–2006 period.
- Gill filed a motion to quash (statute-of-limitations) in Nov. 2015; the district court in Feb. 2016 sustained parts of that motion and left several counts intact.
- Trial was set and subsequently continued several times: Gill moved to continue on June 20, 2016 (to Sept. 14) because depositions were incomplete; the State obtained a continuance in July (to Oct. 12) over Gill’s nonconsent; the State amended the information in October (adding habitual-offender facts) and the court reset trial to Nov. 16 after defense counsel requested time to review the amendment.
- Gill filed a renewed motion to quash on Nov. 4, 2016, and a separate motion for absolute discharge asserting violations of statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights; the district court’s Nov. 14, 2016 order denied absolute discharge but did not rule on the statute-of-limitations motion.
- The district court ruled Gill permanently waived his statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(b) by requesting the continuance that moved the trial date beyond the statutory period; the court alternatively calculated delay attributable to the State and found it insufficient to require discharge.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Gill's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gill permanently waived the statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial right under § 29‑1207(4)(b) by moving to continue trial | Gill’s continuance moved the trial date beyond the statutory 6‑month period, so under the amended statute the statutory right is permanently waived | The continuance was definite (not indefinite) and thus should not trigger a permanent waiver; finding waiver would mean any defensive filing could waive the statutory right | Court held Gill permanently waived the statutory 6‑month right because his continuance extended the trial date beyond the 6‑month period; the definite vs. indefinite nature of the continuance is irrelevant |
| Whether Gill was entitled to absolute discharge on constitutional speedy‑trial grounds | (Implicit) Even if statutory waiver applies, Gill’s constitutional claim must be evaluated and he bears protection under constitutional balancing | Gill argued both statutory and constitutional speedy‑trial violations and sought absolute discharge | Court rejected the constitutional speedy‑trial claim on the merits (no prejudice shown) and affirmed denial of absolute discharge |
| Whether the district court erred by failing to decide Gill’s motion to quash (statute of limitations) and whether that issue is properly before this Court on appeal | State argued the order denying absolute discharge is final and appealable; but ruling on statute-of-limitations motion is not a final, appealable order so it is not properly before the appellate court | Gill argued the court erred by not resolving the motion to quash and preserved the issue for appeal | Court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the statute‑of‑limitations motion because a ruling on such a motion is not a final, appealable order and the November order did not dispose of that motion |
| Whether prior case law requires reading the waiver provision narrowly (e.g., only for indefinite continuances or only for certain continuance reasons) | The statutory amendment was intended to prevent abuse by defense continuances that extend the 6‑month clock; waiver language is broad and not limited to particular types or reasons for continuance | Gill urged a narrow reading to avoid absurd results (any defense action causing delay would waive right) | Court held the statute’s plain language supports a broad, permanent waiver whenever a defendant-requested continuance extends trial beyond 6 months; motive or definiteness of continuance is irrelevant |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (discusses permanent waiver under amended § 29‑1207(4)(b))
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (addresses speedy‑trial computations and critiques of preamendment abuses)
- State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (applies waiver rule when a discharge motion moved trial past the 6‑month clock)
- State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762 (statute‑of‑limitations motion ruled not a final, appealable order)