State v. Gill
297 Neb. 852
Neb.2017Background
- Joseph A. Gill was charged in Nov. 2015 with multiple counts of first-degree sexual assault and incest arising from alleged offenses in the late 1990s–early 2000s and 2005–2006.
- Gill moved to quash portions of the information as time-barred; the district court partially granted and denied that motion in Feb. 2016 and later proceedings adjusted counts and dates.
- Trial was set for July 13, 2016. On June 20, 2016, Gill orally moved for a continuance because depositions were incomplete; the court continued trial to Sept. 14, 2016, and Gill did not object.
- The State obtained an additional continuance (victim pregnancy) and the court moved trial to Oct. 12; later the State amended the information (adding habitual offender facts) and trial was reset to Nov. 16, 2016.
- On Nov. 4, 2016, Gill filed a renewed motion to quash (statute of limitations) and a motion for absolute discharge asserting statutory and constitutional speedy-trial violations; the court denied absolute discharge on Nov. 14, 2016.
- The district court found Gill had permanently waived his statutory 6‑month speedy-trial right under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance that extended the trial date beyond the six-month period; Gill appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Gill) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate court has jurisdiction to review Gill’s statute-of-limitations motion to quash | Order denying absolute discharge is final; but statute-of-limitations rulings are not a substantial-right final order | Argued trial court erred in failing to resolve/consider motion to quash on limitations grounds on appeal | Court: No jurisdiction to review motion to quash here; statute-of-limitations rulings are not final appealable orders and the order did not rule on it |
| Whether Gill permanently waived the statutory 6‑month speedy-trial right under § 29‑1207(4)(b) by requesting a continuance to a date beyond the 6‑month clock | Gill’s June 20 continuance extended trial beyond the 6‑month clock; § 29‑1207(4)(b) creates a permanent waiver when a defendant-requested continuance moves trial past six months | Gill: continuance was for a definite period (not indefinite) and shouldn’t cause permanent waiver; other filings shouldn’t operate as permanent waiver | Court: Waiver applies regardless of whether continuance was definite or indefinite; Gill waived his statutory 6‑month right when he agreed to the continuance that moved trial beyond the statutory period |
| Whether the reason for the continuance affects applicability of the permanent-waiver rule | State: reason irrelevant under statute and precedent | Gill: argued defendant filings generally should not cause permanent waiver; reason and definiteness matter | Court: Reason for continuance irrelevant; the statute’s plain language imposes permanent waiver when a defendant‑requested continuance extends trial beyond six months |
| Whether Gill’s constitutional speedy-trial claim required discharge despite statutory waiver | State: even if statutory right waived, constitutional right remains but requires balancing and showing prejudice | Gill: asserted constitutional violation supporting absolute discharge | Court: Constitutional claim rejected on the merits; statutory waiver does not eliminate constitutional protection but Gill failed to show a constitutional violation that warranted discharge |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mortensen, 287 Neb. 158 (permanent waiver of statutory speedy-trial right when defendant-requested continuance extends trial past six months)
- State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679 (continuance-caused extension beyond six months results in statutory waiver)
- State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (context for legislative amendment; discussion of abuse of speedy-trial clock)
- State v. Hettle, 288 Neb. 288 (interpretation of § 29-1207(4)(b) in prior decisions)
- State v. Loyd, 269 Neb. 762 (statute-of-limitations rulings are not final appealable orders)
- State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241 (distinction between speedy-trial/discharge appeals and statute-of-limitations motions)
- State v. Hood, 294 Neb. 747 (standard of review for speedy-trial dismissal determinations)